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But What Will It Cost?
The Evolution of NASA Cost Estimating
by Joseph W. Hamaker
Within two years of being chartered in 1958 as an
independent agency to conduct civilian pursuits
in aeronautics and space, NASA absorbed either
wholly or partially the people, facilities and
equipment of several existing organizations.
These included, most notably, the laboratories of
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA) at Langley Research Center in Virginia,
Ames Research Center in California, and Lewis
Research Center in Ohio; the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency (ABMA) at Redstone Arsenal
Alabama, for which the team of Wernher yon
Braun worked; and the Department of Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and
their ongoing work on big boosters)
These were especially valuable resources to jump
start the new agency in light of the shocking suc-
cess of the Soviet space probe Sputnik in the
autumn of the previous year and the correspond-
ing pressure from an impatient American public
to produce some response. Along with these
inheritances, there came some existing systems
engineering and management practices, including
project cost estimating methodologies. This paper
will briefly trace the origins of those methods and
how they evolved within the Agency over the
past three decades.
_:_::_._'i_:%The Origins of the Art
World War II had caused a demand for military
aircraft in numbers and in models that far exceed-
ed anything the aircraft industry had even imag-
ined before. While there had been some rudimen-
tary work from time to time 2 to develop paramet-
ric techniques for predicting cost, there was cer-
tainly no widespread use of any kind of cost esti-
mating beyond a laborious build-up of work
hours and materials. A type of statistical estimat-
ing had been suggested in 1936 by T. P. Wright in
the Journal of Aeronautical Science) Wright pro-
vided equations which could be used to predict
the cost of airplanes over long production runs, a
theory which came to be called the learning
curve. By the time the demand for airplanes had
exploded in the early years of World War II,
industrial engineers were happily using Wright's
learning curve to predict the unit cost of airplanes
when thousands were to be built (and it's still
used today though the quantities involved are
more likely to be hundreds instead of thousands).
In the late 1940s the Department of Defense and
especially the U.S. Air Force were studying mul-
tiple scenarios of how the country should proceed
into the new age of jet aircraft, missiles and rock-
ets. The Air Force saw a need for a stable, highly
skilled cadre of analysts to help with the evalua-
tion of these alternatives and established the Rand
Corporation in Santa Monica, California, as a
civilian "think tank" to which it could turn for
independent analysis. Rand's work represents
some of the earliest and most systematic pub-
lished studies of cost estimating in the airplane
industry.
Among the first assignments given to Rand were
studies of first and second generation ICBMs, jet
fighters and jet bombers. While the learning
curve was still very useful for predicting the
behavior of recurring cost, there were still no
techniques other than detailed work-hour and
material estimating for projecting what the first
unit cost might be (a key input to the learning
curve equation). Worse still, no quick methods
were available for estimating the nonrecurring
cost associated with research, development, test-
ing and evaluation (RDT&E). In the defense busi-
ness in the early to mid-1950s, RDT&E had sud-
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denly become a much more important considera-
tion for two reasons. First, a shrinking defense
budget (between World War II and the Korean
War) had cut the number of production units of
most Air Force programs. Second, the cost of
new technology had greatly magnified the cost of
development. The inability to nimbly estimate
RDT&E and first unit production costs was a dis-
tinct problem.
Fortunately, within Rand a cost analysis depart-
ment had been founded in 19504 under David
Novick, who was drafted into the job because he
was the only one around with any cost experi-
ence. This group at Rand proved to be prolific
contributors to the art and science of cost analy-
sis-so much so that the literature of aerospace
cost estimating of the 1950s and i960s is domi-
nated by the scores of Rand cost studies that were
published. 5 Novick and others at Rand deserve
credit for developing and improving the most
basic tool of the cost estimating discipline, the
cost estimating relationship (CER), and merging
the CER with the learning curve to form the foun-
dation of aerospace estimating, which still stands
today. 6
By 1951, Rand was devising CERs for aircraft
cost as a function of such variables as speed,
range, altitude, etc. Acceptable statistical correla-
tions were observed-at least acceptable enough
for the high-level comparisons between alterna-
tives that Rand was doing at the time. When the
data was segregated by aircraft types (e.g., fight-
ers, bombers, cargo aircraft), families of curves
were discovered. Since each curve corresponded
to different levels of complexity, the stratification
helped clarify the development cost trends.
Eventually, a usable set of predictive equations
was derived that was quickly put to use in Air
Force future planning activities.
The use of the CERs and stratification were basic
breakthroughs in cost estimating, especially for
RDT&E and first unit costs. For the first time,
cost analysts saw the promise of being able to
estimate relatively quickly and accurately the cost
of proposed new systems. Rand extended the
methods throughout the 1950s and by the early
1960s the techniques were being acceptably
applied to all phases of aerospace systems. 7
The Early NASA Years
In the spring of 1957 the Army Ballistic Missile
Arsenal (ABMA) in Huntsville, under the direc-
tion of Wernher yon Braun, initiated design stud-
ies on a large and advanced rocket booster that
could be used for large DOD payloads then being
conceptualized. 8 Numerous design options were
under consideration and all of the most promising
needed cost projections. Von Braun's team had
long been flying experimental rockets, but pre-
cious little cost data existed, and none existed for
the scale of the rockets that were coming off the
drawing boards. Nevertheless, estimates were
being demanded. With the procedures that Rand
had used on aircraft, data was pieced together and
plotted against gross liftoff weight because this
performance variable was known both for the his-
torical data points and for the concepts being esti-
mated. The resulting CERs were at the total rock-
et level (engines being added separately based
mainly on contractor estimates) and often did not
inspire much confidence either by their correla-
tion or their number of data points. 9
Suddenly, in the fall of 1957 the Soviets launched
Sputnik I and then, four weeks later, Sputnik II
(carrying a dog), and the Army's big booster
work took on an entirely new importance. While
vehicle configuration studies inspired by the
Soviet success continued at a rapid pace through
1958 and 1959, some momentous programmatic
decisions were made regarding the ultimate man-
agement relationships between ABMA, the Army
Redstone Project Arsenal (ARPA) and NASA.
ABMA and yon Braun, under ARPA sponsorship,
was designing a massive rocket called Saturn.
The DOD, however, as ARPA's parent organiza-
tion, was coming to the conclusion that they did
not need such a super booster and was beginning
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to withdraw support over the objections of both
ARPA and ABMA. In the end, by autumn of
1959, both the Secretary of Defense and President
Eisenhower had concluded that ABMA and the
Saturn should be transferred to NASA. l° In addi-
tion, a new home was found for the von Braun
team by setting aside a complex within the bor-
ders of Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville.
By early fall of 1960, the Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) was operational.
NASA's first 10-year plan had been submitted to
Congress in February 1960 and called for a broad
program of Earth orbital satellites, lunar and plan-
etary probes, larger launch vehicles and manned
flights to Earth orbit and around the moon. The
cost, estimated by analogies, intuition and guess-
es, was given as $1 billion to $1.5 billion per
year. H
With the Kennedy Administration in office by
early 1961, planning for a manned lunar landing
project continued. President Kennedy and Vice
President Johnson were both interested in options
for moving ahead of the Soviets, and NASA was
working on a set of plans that could have an
American on the lunar surface shortly after the
turn of the decade. The orbiting of Yuri Gagarin
in April 1961 caused immediate questions from
the Administration and Congress about the costs
of accelerating the plans. Jim Webb, the NASA
Administrator, had been briefed on $10 billion
cost estimates associated with the moon project.
Prudently, he decided to give himself some rope
and gave Congress a $20 to $40 billion range.
(The program was to cost about $20 billion
ultimately.)
Despite the magnitude of the cost projections, in
his State of the Union address in May 1961,
President Kennedy established his famous goal of
a lunar mission before the end of the decade.
NASA was off and running. MSFC took respon-
sibility for the Saturn launch vehicles, and the
new Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) in
Houston, created in mid-1962 but operating
before that out of Langley, was given responsibil-
ity for the payload, in this case the modules that
would take the astronauts to the moon's surface
and back.
During the same period that MSFC was being
organized, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in
California, in business as an Army research orga-
nization since the 1930s, was transferred to
NASA from the Army. JPL had already built the
Explorer satellite that had ridden an ABMA rock-
et into orbit as the country's first successful
response to Sputnik. JPL began its association
with NASA by being assigned the lead center role
for Agency planetary projects. As JPL began
designing several planetary probes, including the
Ranger series of lunar spacecraft, the planetary
series of Mariner spacecraft and the Lunar
Surveyor spacecraft, they were dependent primar-
ily upon contractor quotes for purchased hard-
ware and their own work-hour and material esti-
mates for inhouse work.
As the pace of planning picked up, they began to
use an Air Force tool, the Space Planners
Guide, _2 a chapter of which is devoted to weight-
based CERs for space project estimating. In 1967,
Bill Ruhland, a former Chrysler Saturn I-C man-
ager, went to work at JPL and contracted with a
new company called Planning Research
Corporation (which had been started by some for-
mer analysts who had worked on the Space
Planners Guide) to improve the CERs) 3 Ruhland
stuck with estimating, and went on to become
NASA's preeminent estimator for planetary
spacecraft throughout the 1970s and 1980s. PRC
leveraged its beginnings with JPL and Ruhland
by establishing cost modeling contracts with most
of the other NASA centers and dominating the
development of NASA cost models for the next
25 years.
In March 1961, with launch vehicles, manned
capsules and planetary spacecraft work underway,
NASA established the Goddard Space Flight
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Center (GSFC) as another development center.
GSFC was assigned responsibility for Earth
orbital science satellites and soon had on the
drawing board a number of spacecraft for which
cost estimates were needed. The Orbiting
Astronomical Observatory, the Orbiting
Geophysical Observatory and the Nimbus pro-
grams were all started early in the 1959-60 period
and, like most other projects in the Agency at the
time, experienced significant cost growth. GSFC
organized a cost group to improve the estimates,
first under Bill Mecca, and later managed by Paul
Villone. In 1967 Werner Gruhl joined the office
where he implemented numerous improvements
to the GSFC methods. In later years he joined the
Comptroller's office at NASA Headquarters as
NASA's chief estimator.
Among the improvements creditable to GSFC
during the late 1960s and early 1970s were: 1)
spacecraft cost models that were sensitive to the
number of complete and partial test units and the
quality of the test units; 2) models devoted to
estimating spacecraft instruments; and 3) the
expansion of the database through the practice of
contracting with the prime contractor to docu-
ment the cost in accordance with NASA standard
parametric work breakdown structures (WBS)
and approaches. 14
By 1965 most of NASA's contractors were revis-
ing their traditional approach to cost estimating,
which had relied upon the design engineers to
estimate costs, replacing it with an approach that
created a new job position-that of trained para-
metric cost estimators whose job it was to obtain
data from the design engineers and translate this
information into cost estimates using established
procedures. 15 At essentially the same time, cost
estimating was being elevated to a separate disci-
pline within NASA Headquarters and at the
NASA field centers. This trend toward cost esti-
mating as a specialization was caused by several
factors. First, it was unrealistic to expect that the
design engineers had the interest, skills and
resources necessary to put together good cost esti-
mates. Second, during the preceding three years,
the pace of the Gemini and Apollo programs had
so accelerated that the Requests for Proposals
issued by the government typically gave the con-
tractors only 30 days to respond-only parametri-
cians had any hope of preparing a response in this
short amount of time. Third, because of growing
cost overrun problems, NASA cost reviews had
increased notably and the reviewers were looking
for costs with some basis in historical
actuals-essentially a prescription for parametric
cost estimating.
At both MSC and MSFC, the cost estimating
function was placed in an advanced mission plan-
ning organization. At MSC, it was embodied
within Max Faget's Engineering and
Development Directorate, _6 and at MSFC it was
within the Future Projects Office headed by
Herman Koelle? 7 Faget, an incredibly gifted engi-
neer, had already left his imprint on the Mercury,
Gemini and Apollo programs, and was a strong
believer in an advanced planning function with
strong cost analysis. Koelle, a German engineer
who, though not a member of the original team,
had later joined von Braun, was also extremely
competent and very interested in cost. Koelle had,
in fact, along with his deputy William G. Huber,
assembled the very first NASA cost methodology
in 1960, published first in an inhouse report TM and
then in 1961 as a handbook that Koelle edited for
budding space engineers._9
Out of the eye of the Apollo hurricane for the
moment, both the MSFC and the MSC cost per-
sonnel now sought to regroup and attempt to
make improvements in capability. In 1964 MSFC
contracted with Lockheed and General
Dynamics 2o to develop a more rigorous and
sophisticated cost modeling capability for launch
vehicle life cycle cost modeling. This effort was
led by Terry Sharpe of MSFC's Future Projects
Office. Sharpe, an Operations Research specialist
interested in improving the rigor of the estimating
process, led the MSFC estimating group as they
managed the contractor's development of the
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model and then brought it in-house and installed
the model on MSFC mainframe computers.
Through about 1965 the only computational sup-
port in use by NASA estimators was the Freidan
mechanical calculator. By the mid-1960s main-
frame time was generally available, and by the
late 1960s the miracle of hand-held, four-function
electronic calculators could be had for $400
apiece-one per office was the general rule.
Throughout the early 1970s the hand-held calcu-
lator ruled supreme. By the middle 1970s IMSAI
8080 8-bit microcomputers made their appear-
ance. Finally, by the late 1970s the age of the per-
sonal computer had dawned. Estimators, probably
more than any other breed, immediately saw the
genius of the Apple II, the IBM PC and the amaz-
ing spreadsheets: Visicalc, Supercalc and
Lotus 1-2-3. Civilization had begun.
The resulting capability was extremely ambitious
for the time, taking into account a multitude of
variables affecting launch vehicle life cycle cost.
The model received significant notoriety, and
once the CIA inquired if the MSFC estimators
might make a series of runs on a set of Soviet
launch vehicles. Busy with their own work, the
estimators demurred. The CIA pressed the case to
a higher level manager, a retired Air Force
colonel. Suddenly the MSFC estimators discov-
ered that they had been mistaken about priorities.
The runs were made and the CIA analysts went
away happy.
Later in 1964 after a reorganization, management
of the MSFC cost office was taken over by Bill
Rutledge who went on to lead the MSFC cost
group for more than 20 years. Rutledge steadily
built the MSFC cost group's strength until it was
generally recognized in the late 1960s as the
strongest cost organization within the Agency.
One of Rutledge's more outstanding innovations
was the acquisition of a contractor to expand and
maintain an Agency-wide cost database and
develop new models. The REDSTAR (Resource
Data Storage and Retrieval) database was begun
in 1971 and is still operational today, supporting
Agency-wide cost activities. The contract was
originally awarded to PRC and, under Rutledge's
management, developed numerous models
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
MSFC also established a grassroots cost estimat-
ing organization within the MSFC Science and
Engineering laboratories. This group was man-
aged by Rod Stewart for a number of years. After
his retirement from NASA, Stewart, along with
his wife Annie, authored an outstanding series of
cost estimating books, z_ In 1966, MSC, working
in parallel to the MSFC activities, contracted with
General Dynamics z2 and Rand 23 to improve their
spacecraft estimating capability. The MSC cost
group also significantly improved their capabili-
ties during this period under the very able man-
agement of Humboldt Mandell, who was later to
play a leading role in the Shuttle, Space Station
and Space Exploration Initiative cost estimating
activities.
By 1967 both the MSC and MSFC cost estimat-
ing organizations were beginning to obtain the
first historical data from the flight hardware of
the Apollo program. This included cost data on
the Saturn IB and Saturn V launch vehicles by
stage, and on the Command and Service Module
(CSM) and the Lunar Excursion Module (LEM)
at the major subsystem level. Fairly shallow data
by today's standards, it was considered somewhat
of a windfall to the NASA estimators who had
been struggling along with two- and three-data
point CERs at the total system level. The Project
Offices at MSC and MSFC compiled the data
between 1967 and 1969 and documented the
resuhs in the unpublished "Apollo Cost Study"
(preserved today in the JSC and MSFC cost
group databases). Eventually this was supple-
mented by paying the CSM prime contractor to
retroactively compile the data in a WBS format
useful for parametric cost estimating. 24 Despite
these improvements, one Rand report in 1967
laments that the number of data points for cost
estimating was "depressingly low.., only one
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subsystem contains more than four data points"
and "this paucity of data precludes the application
of statistical techniques either in the development
of the CERs themselves, or in the establishment
of confidence levels for the predictive values gen-
erated by the CERs. ''25
While most of the science programs were man-
aged out of JPL and GSFC, the "research centers"
(Ames, Langley, and Lewis) were also given
development projects from time to time. Ames
managed the Pioneer planetary probes, Langley
managed the Lunar Orbiter and the Viking Mars
mission, and LeRC managed the Centaur project.
Generally, the costs were estimated using models
from the other Centers.
The Shuttle Era: Promise of
Low Cost
By 1968 the nation was immersed in social and
political turmoil, the Vietnam War, and the
attempt to build the Great Society. Though the
accomplishment of the first manned lunar landing
was not to occur until the following year, the bud-
get that NASA received was lower than the previ-
ous year and broke the trend of ever increasing
flows of money that the Agency had enjoyed
since its creation a decade before. NASA realized
that the dream of building directly on the expend-
able Saturn launch vehicle technology, building
Earth orbital and lunar orbital space stations, con-
tinuing exploration of the lunar surface and
mounting an expedition to Mars were not in the
immediate plans.
By early 1969, while the ongoing Apollo program
prepared for the Apollo 11 mission to the moon
on which humans would land for the first time,
future planning activities within NASA had been
scaled back from the overly ambitious, broad set
of space activities to focus on the crucial next
step. Space stations, moon bases and Mars mis-
sions all needed low-cost, routine transportation
from the Earth's surface to low Earth orbit. If the
budget realities precluded doing everything at
once, then the next thrust would be in low Earth
orbit transportation as a first building block to all
the rest. A task force was assigned in March 1969
to study the problem and recommend options for
further study. 26 This report called for the develop-
ment of a new space shuttle system that could
meetcertain performance and cost-per-flight
objectives. Many options were examined, but the
fully reusable two-stage was the preferred choice
because it seemed to offer the lowest recurring
cost. Concurrently with these inhouse assess-
ments, four parallel Phase A (i.e., conceptual
design) studies had been awarded to General
Dynamics, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas and
North American (today's Rockwell International).
For most of 1969 these studies proceeded apace,
churning out massive stacks of paper designs,
along with cost numbers that gave the impression
that all was well. For around $10 billion in devel-
opment costs, the most reusable Shuttle configu-
rations offered recurring costs of only a few mil-
lion dollars per flight.
As the Phase A studies neared completion in late
1969, however, two cost-related problems began
to emerge. First, NASA's communications with
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
revealed that the outlook for the NASA budget
was not good. The projections showed that con-
tinued reductions in NASA's funding were
inevitable; the lower budget numbers did not
match the amount needed to fund the favored
Shuttle designs. Second, as NASA reviewed the
contractor's cost estimates for the Shuttle and
compared the numbers to their own estimates, it
became clear that no one in the industry or the
government had a good handle on what the
Shuttle could be expected to cost. 27 The problem
with the estimates was analogous data. A winged,
reusable spaceship had never been built before
and all the cost estimates were being based on
extrapolations from large aircraft such as the C-5,
B-52, B-70 (for wings, fuselage, landing gear,
etc.), from the Saturn (for tanks, thrust structure,
etc.) and from the Apollo capsules (for crew sys-
tems). The problem was compounded by the
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scope of the estimating job. All the various
designs being contemplated overloaded the esti-
mating resources that NASA had at the time. The
entire complement of NASA estimators at the two
lead centers (JSC and MSFC) numbered only
eight people, yet cost was to be one of the most
key variables in the decision making process con-
cerning the Shuttle. 28
Because the magnitude of the upfront costs of the
fully reusable systems had not yet been adequate-
ly estimated, NASA proceeded into Phase B in
mid-1970 with the intent of putting more meat on
the bones of the skeletal designs. Meanwhile,
negotiations with OMB continued concerning the
budget outlook, and the numbers got lower and
lower. Slowly, the cost estimates became more
realistic just as the Phase B studies were nearing
completion in the summer of 1971. The studies
were extended so that cost cutting measures could
be investigated. First, expendable drop tanks were
substituted for reusable interior tanks. Then the
flyback booster was scrapped, first for expend-
able liquid rocket boosters, then for expendable
solid rocket boosters. Taken together, these reduc-
tions made it possible to barely fit the Shuttle's
development within the OMB guidelines, but
each change had added to the recurring cost per
flight. 29
But the Shuttle peak year funding versus the
OMB budget cap was not the only cost question
dogging the Shuttle. For the mandated Mercury,
Gemini and Apollo programs, money had flowed
without any requirement for the Agency to show
economic justification for the projects. When the
idea of a Shuttle system was floated in 1969 as
part of NASA's plans after Apollo, the OMB
decided that such an expensive undertaking ought
to show some economic benefits that outweighed
the costs. Because the analytical skills for an eco-
nomic justification did not exist inhouse and
NASA thought it wise to have "independent" sup-
port for the Shuttle, the Agency hired the
Aerospace Corporation, Lockheed and the econo-
mist Oskar Morgenstern and his company
Mathematica to develop the data OMB wanted to
see. Morgenstern turned the economic analysis
over to a young protEgE named Klaus Heiss.
Heiss put together an impressive study 3° that
compared the life cycle costs of the Shuttle with
the costs of the equally capable expendable
launch vehicles. One of the more important argu-
ments for the Shuttle case was that payloads on
the Shuttle would cost considerably less than pay-
loads on expendables, a notion that was based on
an extensive cost estimating study done for
NASA by Lockheed. 31This study, a classic for its
scope, originality and methodology, nevertheless
reached an exactly wrong conclusion.
It is known now that Shuttle payloads actually
cost more than those that fly on expendable
launch vehicles due to the strenuous safety review
process for a manned vehicle. But Lockheed fore-
casted that the payload developers would save
about 40 percent of their costs from the advan-
tages offered by the Shuttle. The advantages were
chiefly thought to be that: 1) the relatively high
weight lifting performance and payload bay vol-
ume offered by the Shuttle would allow payloads
to ease up on lightweighting and miniaturization,
which are cost drivers; 2) the Shuttle would
allow retrieval and refurbishment of satellites
instead of buying additional copies as was neces-
sary with expendable rockets; and 3) a single
national launch system such as the Shuttle would
allow standardization of payloads instead of mul-
tiple designs configured for the plethora of
expendable vehicle interfaces. Finally, it was
Aerospace's job to determine the payload require-
ments and produce traffic models, and they ulti-
mately forecasted the need for 60 Shuttle flights
per year.32 While the Shuttle payload benefits and
flight rates were both flawed assumptions, Klaus
Heiss constructed a discounted cost benefit analy-
sis that asserted savings in the billions. At the
least, the Aerospace, Lockheed, Mathematica
work sent the OMB accountants to murmuring.
President Nixon finally gave the nod, and the
Shuttle's detailed design began in the summer of
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1972 under contract to the winning prime con-
tractor, North American-though this did not end
the debate over the worthiness of the project. 33
All through 1973 NASA was very involved in
extensive "capture/cost" analyses to produce data
to answer Congressional, GAO and OMB
inquiries about the Shuttle's economic forecasts.
These analyses were NASA inhouse extensions
of the work done by Mathematica, Lockheed and
Aerospace. The studies consumed most of the
resources of the MSFC and JSC cost groups as
well as Headquarters program office personnel.
They compared the discounted life cycle costs of
"capturing" the NASA and DOD payloads with
the Shuttle versus expendable launch vehicles.
The Shuttle case was finally determined to yield a
14 percent internal rate of return and $14 billion
of benefits (in 1972 dollars). This data was used
as the final reinforcement of the Shuttle program
commitment.
N Declining Budgets, Rising Costs
Once Shuttle development was safely underway
by 1974, most of the estimating talent of the
Agency was turned to various kinds of scientific
satellite estimating. As NASA's budget declined
in the 1970s, both JPL and GSFC pioneered such
economies as the use of the protoflight concept in
spacecraft development. Before the 1970s NASA
had prototyped most spacecraft (i.e., built one or
more prototypes which served as ground test arti-
cles) before building the flight article. In the
protoflight approach, only one complete space-
craft is built, which serves first as the ground test
article and is then refurbished as the flight article.
The protoflight approach theoretically saves
money. However, these savings must be balanced
against the cost of refurbishing the test article into
a state ready for flight, the cost of maintaining
more rigid configuration control of the ground
test article to insure its eventual flight worthiness,
and the increased risk of having less hardware.
Other attempts were made to lower cost without
much success. Low estimates based on wishful
thinking concerning off-the-shelf hardware and
reduced complexity proved unrealistic, and over-
runs began to breed more overruns as projects
underway ate up the funds other projects had
expected.
Meanwhile, as NASA Headquarters continued to
guide the overall programs, handle the political
interfaces, foster other external relations, and
integrate and defend the Agency budget, a need
was seen to strengthen the Washington cost
analysis function. 34 Having moved to the
Headquarters Comptroller's Office from GSFC in
1970, Werner Gruhl set up an independent review
capability under Mal Peterson, an assistant to the
Comptroller. Gruhl aggressively championed the
constant improvement of the database. GruhI and
Peterson's greatest contribution was probably
their relentless urging for realistic estimates. They
also initiated an annual symposium for all NASA
estimators and were instrumental in helping to
establish a process for Non-Advocate Reviews
(NARs) for potential new projects.
The NAR was instituted as a required milestone
in which each major new project had to prove its
maturity to an impartial panel of technical, man-
agement and cost experts before going forward.
As part of the NAR process, Peterson and Gruhl,
working with a relatively small staff of one to
three analysts, undertook to perform independent
estimates of most of the major new candidates for
authorization. Peterson largely devoted himself to
penetrating reviews of the technical and program-
matic readiness, the underpinning of the cost esti-
mate. Gruhl, using mostly models of his own
developed from the REDSTAR database, generat-
ed his own estimates. Together they were a formi-
dab4e team and undoubtedly reduced the cost
overrun problem from what it would have been
without the NAR.
Another significant milestone in cost estimating
that occurred during the 1970s was the emergence
of the Price Model. First developed within RCA
by Frank Freiman, the model began to be market-
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ed in 1975 by RCA as a commercially available
model. Freiman's brainchild was arguably the sin-
gle most innovative occurrence in parametric cost
estimating ever. His genius was to see hardware
development and production costs as a process
governed by logical interrelationships between a
handful of key variables. Probably feeling his
way with intuition and engineering experience
more than hard data, Freiman derived a set of
algorithms that modeled these relationships. The
resulting model could then be calibrated to a par-
ticular organization's historical track record by
essentially running the model backward to dis-
cover what settings for the variables gave the
known cost. Once calibrated, the model could be
run forward using a rich set of technical and pro-
grammatic factors to predict the cost of future
projects. While the Price models are applicable to
a wide range of industries in addition to aero-
space, the model first found use in the aerospace
industry. NASA encouraged Freiman to market
his invention, and actually provided him with
data for calibrating the model after observing its
potential in Shuttle cost estimating. 35 The success
of the Price model inspired the development of
several other commercial cost models with appli-
cation to hardware, software and the life cycle.
By the late 1970s and into the mid-1980s, the cost
of NASA projects was a serious problem. It was
now obvious that Shuttle payloads cost more, not
less, than payloads on unmanned vehicles.
Overruns were worse than ever despite better
databases, better models, better estimators, and
more stringent Headquarters reviews. It seemed
that NASA was in danger of pricing itself right
out of business. 36 At JSC, Hum Mandell, assisted
by Richard Whitlock and Kelly Cyr, initiated
analyses of this problem. Making imaginative use
of the Price model, 3v they found that NASA's cul-
ture drives cost and that the complexity of NASA
projects had been steadily increasing, an idea also
advanced by Gruhl. Mandell argued persuasively
to NASA management for a change in culture
from the exotically expensive to the affordable.
At the same time, he argued that estimates of
future projects needed to account for the steadily
increasing complexity of NASA projects.
_."',_ Recent Years
Once the Space Shuttle had begun operations,
NASA turned its attention once again to defining
a Space Station. After Pre-Phase A and Phase A
studies had analyzed several configurations, in
1983 NASA ran a Washington-based, multi-cen-
ter team called the Configuration Development
Group (CDG) to lead the Phase B studies. The
CDG was led by Luther Powell, an experienced
MSFC project manager. For his chief estimator,
Powell chose O'Keefe Sullivan, a senior estima-
tor from the MSFC cost group. Sullivan had just
completed managing the development of the PRC
Space Station Cost Model, 38 an innovative model
that created a Space Station WBS by cleverly
combining historical data points from parts of the
Shuttle Orbiter, Apollo modules, unmanned
spacecraft and other projects. This model was dis-
tributed and used by all four of the Work Package
Centers and was probably the most satisfactory
parametric cost model ever developed by NASA.
Work Package 1 (WP-1) was at MSFC, with
responsibility for the Station modules; WP-2 was
at JSC with responsibility for truss structures,
RCS and C&DH; WP-3 was at LeRC with
responsibility for power; and WP-4 was at GSFC
with responsibility for platforms. Sullivan used
the model to estimate the project at between
$11.8 and $14 billion (in 1984 dollars). The con-
tent of this estimate included the initial capability,
eight-person, 75-kilowatt station and space plat-
forms at two different orbital locations, with addi-
tional dollars required later to grow the program
to full capability) 9
Meanwhile, NASA Administrator Jim Beggs had
been negotiating with the OMB for support to
start the project. Under pressure to propose some-
thing affordable, Beggs committed to Congress in
September 1983 that a Station could be construct-
ed for $8 billion, a rather random number in light
of the known estimates and the fact that the con-
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ceptuaI design had never settled down to an
extent necessary for a solid definition and cost
estimate. Nevertheless, the Agency pushed ahead
with the Phase B studies and by fall 1987, need-
ing to narrow the options in configurations still
being debated between the Centers, established a
group called the Critical Evaluation Task Force
(CETF), quartered at LaRC and led by LaRC
manager Ray Hook. Hook brought Bill Rutledge
in from MSFC to lead the cost analysis effort, and
Rutledge assembled a team made up of estimators
representing the Work Package Centers and
Headquarters (Bill Hicks, Richard Whitlock, Tom
LaCroix, and Dave Bates). Over a period of a few
intense weeks, they generated the cost of the new
baseline, which, even after significant require-
ments had been cut, still totaled at least
$14 billion.
NASA reluctantly took this cost to the OMB.
Seeking to inspire a can-do attitude among the
CETF team, NASA management passed out but-
tons containing the slogan "We Can Do It!" One
senior estimator, who had seen it all before, modi-
fied his but/on to read "We Can Do It For $20
Billion! ''40 Amid great political turmoil, the Space
Station was finally given a go-ahead. Despite
contractor proposed costs that were more unreal-
istically optimistic than usual, the source evalua-
tions were completed and contracts were awarded
for the four work packages. The project managed
to survive several close calls in the FY 1988
through FY 1991 budgets, though with steadily
escalating costs and several iterations of require-
ments cutbacks and redesigns. Like the purchase
of a car, the sticker price includes nonrecurring
cost only, and this is the cost NASA had always
quoted Congress for new projects, including the
Space Station. During the long and winding road
of gaining Congressional authority for the
Station, NASA was asked to include other costs
such as Station growth, Shuttle launch costs,
operations costs, and various other costs, which
led to confusion and charges of even more cost
growth than actually occurred.
As this is being written, NASA is actively design-
ing and estimating the cost of several major
future programs including the Earth Observation
System, the National Launch System and the
Space Exploration Initiative, among others. Each
of these programs, like most NASA programs
before them, is unique unto itself and presents a
new set of cost estimating challenges. At the
same time, the recent years of growth in budget
resources that NASA has enjoyed seems to have
run its course. In an era of relatively level budget
authority, NASA is seeking ways to maximize the
amount of program obtainable. New ideas on this
topic abound. Total Quality Management, Design
to Cost, Concurrent Engineering and a number of
other cultural changes are being suggested as a
solution to the problems of high cost. As usual,
the NASA estimating community is in the mid-
dle. Armed with data from the past, which some-
how must be adapted to estimate the future, they
attempt to answer the all important question: But
what will it cost?
So brief a treatment of the history of NASA cost
estimating leaves so much unsaid that apologies
are in order. Nothing was mentioned of the aero-
nautical side of NASA, yet they estimate the cost
of projects that are no less important to the nation
than the space projects focused upon here. The
Kennedy Space Center facilities and operations
costing was not mentioned, though nothing
NASA has sent to space could have been sent
without them. Whole projects from which much
was learned about cost estimating (Viking,
Skylab, Spacelab, Centaur-G, Hubble Space
Telescope, Galileo, Magellan, Ulysses and many
others) had to be left unexplored. Even when
touched upon, many subjects were given only the
barest of treatments, the expansion left for other
studies. Finally, and worst of all, while this paper
unfairly singles out a dozen or so individuals,
another few score men and women who have
labored hard in the crucial and controversial busi-
ness of NASA cost estimating will not see their
names here. They are saluted anyway.
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Sam II - How We Did It
by Ed Mauldin, Reggie Holloway, Don Hedgepeth and Ron Baker
SAM II is a very successful first-generation
atmospheric research experiment developed for
the Nimbus 7 observatory by the Langley
Research Center. It came into existence within
tight resource and short schedule constraints by a
core project team of four engineers. Even though
SAM II has been in orbit for over 14 years, it
continues to meet scientific mission objectives.
SAM II was recognized by the American
Meteorological Society in January 1991-earning
the Principal Investigator, Dr. M. E McCormick,
the Jules G. Charney Award for "... outstanding
contributions to satellite sensing through develop-
ment of solar occultation instruments for elucida-
tion of the nature of Polar Stratospheric Clouds"
which are central to understanding the heteroge-
neous chemistry that causes the Antarctic ozone
h01e.
Today's spiraling cost, long development sched-
ule, and large resource estimates to develop new
spaceflight instruments begs a close review of
past concepts to determine if they are applicable
today. This paper describes technical approaches
and management techniques used during the peri-
od from 1973 to 1978, many of which fit within
today's TQM initiatives.
We began relatively inexperienced and none of us
knew any of the others when selected for the pro-
ject. Only half of the team had flight hardware
experience. All were GSll/12 engineers. Given
the high visibility of the Nimbus program, the
risks involved with development of a sophisticat-
ed, first-generation instrument, and the limited
experience of the project team, Langley manage-
ment could have micromanaged us to death.
Instead, they accepted the risk and let us do our
jobs without interference. They gave us the
resources and the responsibility and we accepted
the accountability for SAM II's success. They
empowered us to speak with their authority in
making real time decisions. Today, this is known
as TQM.
Middle line managers helped us with technical
advice, but we dealt with the upper managers for
all management-related issues. They took a keen
personal interest in SAM II and in our efforts.
They visited the University of Wyoming (UWY)
and Ball Aerospace on many occasions and knew
our contractor counterparts. When asked, they
even helped us with technical advice. They pro-
vided several analyses, including the Aliasing
Error Analysis that we used in our instrument
error budget.
They probably could have prevented us from
making some mistakes, but wisely used restraint
and correctly judged that in the final analysis, the
experience gained from these mistakes would
provide a greater long-term benefit than the tem-
porary setbacks caused by them. And when we
made mistakes, we accepted full responsibility
without trying to pass the buck, and then worked
twice as hard until we had the problem corrected.
They offered virtually unlimited support as need-
ed from the line organizations at the Center. The
main benefit of the close relationship of the SAM
II team with upper management was the tremen-
dous boost in team morale derived from having
their trust, confidence, support, and freedom to do
things our way without interference.
Each SAM II team member maintained strong
relationships with mentors, and each considers
this relationship to have had a major positive
influence on development of personal and techni-
cal skills necessary for SAM II success. We also
strongly advocated and succeeded in getting our
contractor and subcontractor to provide mentors
for their young engineers.
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_-'#, Adherence to Phased
Project Planning
Although we had no text to follow on phased pro-
ject planning, we followed all the classical princi-
ples and covered all the bases that are contained
in today's writings on project life cycles. These
include: 1) establishing a clear set of science mis-
sion requirements and then convening these into
instrument performance requirements during Pre-
Phase A; 2) exploring potential instrument con-
cepts that could deliver the necessary perfor-
mance, lifetime and reliability during Phase A; 3)
conducting technology surveys to select the most
feasible candidate concepts, performing tradeoff
studies to evaluate relative merits of candidate
concepts, and evaluating technology state-of-the-
art and performing risk analysis of candidate con-
cepts in Phase B; 4) selecting a system and then
subsystems concepts and quickly moving to the
hardware phase by building an Engineering
Model (EM) to do development testing to qualify
selected concepts during Phase C; and finally, 5)
fabricating, performance testing, and flight quali-
fication testing of hardware during Phase D.
We could have written the current textbook on
project life cycle principles. We moved to hard-
ware quickly during Phase C/D and built an all-
up Engineering Model that proved to be a major
key to our success. The EM was thoroughly eval-
uated and tested, and many ProtoFlight Model
(PFM) design refinements came from unforeseen
problems during fabrication and testing or from
failure to meet performance requirements during
testing. The EM gave us a "test bed" that allowed
quick evaluation of potential fixes without endan-
gering flight hardware. All of our significant
problems were quickly identified and corrected
with permanent solutions using the EM hardware.
Analyses are good tools, but the real proof of a
design is in hardware performance. Also, the EM
permitted testing beyond flight test limits, which
helped to evaluate reliability, lifetime, and safety
margin. Our EM testing was not constrained by
QA issues, nor the number of test cycles-factors
that must be strongly addressed with flight
hardware.
Many design flaws were discovered during the
EM fabrication and test phase. The most notable
failure was that of the elevation gimbal flex piv-
ots during vibration testing. This resulted in an
elevation gimbal redesign, including development
of an isolation grommet design that has been used
by three subsequent solar occultation instruments.
[] Risk Management
Early in the SAM II project, we conducted a sur-
vey of the availability and status of technologies
that would be required for successful develop-
ment. We did not take a conservative technical
approach and were willing to accept many new
and unproven designs and approaches. In retro-
spect, we used extraordinary engineering judg-
ment in accepting some high-risk approaches that
succeeded and in rejecting others that in hindsight
would have given us problems. Many of the high-
risk designs and approaches that were selected
probably would be questioned in today's conserv-
ative environment.
We identified and ranked risks and put consider-
able effort into reducing those that could cause
catastrophic problems. For high-risk designs, we
aggressively pursued a risk reduction program
that usually included fabrication of test articles,
qualification testing, life testing, evaluation of
results, and assessment of residual risk. Decisions
were not based on a "hunch" or even an "educat-
ed guess," but were based on doing a lot of
risk/payoff homework, identifying the develop-
ment required, and then conducting the necessary
development program. The problems incurred
were not as severe as one would expect from a
first generation design, and this risk management
approach played a major role in the SAM II
success.
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_:::_i_'i_il_Strong Systems Engineering
Approach
Another major key to the SAM II success was
effective systems engineering. We believed that
with effective systems engineering, the project
management process would take care of itself. Ed
Mauldin, as Instrument Manager, had the closest
role to that of a Project Manager, but this can be
described as a part-time job since his full-time
responsibility was optics and radiometric engi-
neering. His project management efforts mainly
consisted of administrative tasks necessary to
keep the books in order; reporting tasks to pro-
vide monthly MIC reports and status reviews to
Langley Research Center and Goddard Space
Flight Center management; and coordination
activities such as planning for the design reviews.
Although picked to cover optics, electronics,
mechanical, and control system disciplines, we
used a systems approach for design and problem
solving. Thus, an optimized design was devel-
oped that has changed very little in the SAGE,
SAGE II, and SAGE III instruments that have fol-
lowed. This strong systems engineering approach
eliminated many potential problems and also
formed a "checks and balance" relationship
among team members where each forced the
other to do homework in order to defend a design
or problem solving approach to the other team
members. We became interchangeable and looked
out for all disciplines when only one of us was in
the contractor's plant to review a design, discuss
concerns and problems, or operate the instrument
during a test. We were also blessed in having an
outstanding systems engineer at Ball Aerospace.
_ii,_!_Effective Schedule and Cost Control
Much of our success can be attributed to having
an excellent working schedule. Although every
subsystem of the SAM II instrument had unfore-
seen problems that were significant schedule dri-
vers, the PFM delivery was shipped only two
months after the originally contracted date. This
included recovery from a flex-pivot failure during
vibration testing that by itself caused a 30-week
delay in the CDR and EM delivery. We actually
recovered all but one month of lost PFM sched-
ule, but then lost a month waiting for a high-qual-
ity sun in Boulder, Colorado needed to perform
the final Baseline Systems Test.
Maintenance of this excellent working schedule
can be attributed to Lillian Henry of the
University of Wyoming, who developed her
PERT and technical skills while working on
Project Hawkeye at the University of Iowa.
Lillian kept an up-to-date PERT schedule in front
of us at all times. PERT was used to provide an
efficient guide on how to get from here to there,
not to point out that the contractor was failing to
keep schedule. We had weekly reviews by tele-
conference (including Langley, UWY, and Ball
teams) in which PERT was used as a tool to
review all critical and near-critical path activities
and conduct brainstorming to find efficient
workarounds to minimize schedule slip when
problems arose. For a significant period in the
middle of the program, all subsystem paths were
parallel critical due to implementation of
workarounds. PERT activities were focused, peo-
ple oriented, and broken out into daily increments
until PFM delivery. PERT revisions were fre-
quently made to reflect the current best assess-
ment of the most efficient sequence of activities.
We even included the Wyoming and Colorado
first week of hunting season as a PERT consider-
ation, since many of our contractors were avid
hunters. PERT was used as a daily management
tool as opposed to a monthly reporting tool.
Cost control was very simple by today's comput-
erized Performance Measurement System (PMS)
standards-yet very effective. When one of us vis-
ited UWY or Ball, one of our first activities was
to meet with the Project Manager and review cost
and schedule. We wanted to see which activities
had been completed since our last review and
which were in progress, with the names of indi-
viduals attached. We wanted to see how many
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hours these individuals had charged to the SAM
II account. Then, we personally went to the indi-
vidual and asked to see results, such as analyses
completed, drawings completed, fabrication com-
pleted, testing completed, etc. It did not take
rocket scientists' skills to find the soft spots, and
when these were found, we had meetings with the
responsible supervisors and asked for (and
received) explanations and remedial action. As
shown in the table below, the system worked very
effectively. Even without a PMS type system, our
cost-to-complete proved reasonably accurate and
we did not have any financial surprises.
COST AND SCHEDULE
PERFORMANCE
SAM II PLAN
• Langley inhouse cost estimate: $2.4M
• Original budget (including contingency): $3.5M
• Original ProtoFlight Model delivery: 32 months after
C/D start
SAM I1 ACTUALS
• Contract signed for: $2.177M
• Contract cost runout: $3.165M
• Contract cost overrun: $0.482M
• SAM II instrument total cost (11/9/77): $3.250M
• Delivery: 34 months after C/D start
Small Core Team
We operated as a small core team backed by tech-
nical experts from within the line organizations.
Thus, we were a clearinghouse for all line organi-
zations participating on SAM II, which permitted
rapid response to contractor technical issues. We
often used specialists for ad hoc support, and
when we needed support, we were not required to
go through line organization channels for
approval. Some efforts only took a day or
two-other efforts seldom took longer than a week
or two. Significant problems, such as the flex-
pivot failure, were attacked intensively with tiger
teams. On these occasions, the focused activities
led to quick and permanent solutions that allowed
the project to move forward with a minimum of
delay.
Our ad hoc team members, most of whom came
out of research organizations, were eager to help
us. We never had to persuade any of them to work
on SAM II even though on most occasions they
were very busy and had to push their regular
activities aside. This approach resulted in a con-
siderable manpower savings at the Center and a
cost savings to the project.
Although strangers to each other when SAM II
began, we immediately developed strong bonds
and close personal relationships, and we remain
lifelong friends. We spent many hours together
professionally and socially. However, the close
personal relationships did not stifle strong debates
on the issues, for each of us was very outspoken
as we aired our concerns in frequent team meet-
ings. And these concerns were always taken as
positive critiques as opposed to personal criti-
cism. The fact that a mechanical engineer could
grill an optical engineer on optics without the
optical engineer taking it personally (and vice
versa for other team members) testifies to the
strong interpersonal relationships that existed
among us.
_ Communication Barriers
Early in the SAM II development, we were faced
with a very difficult situation regarding commu-
nication channels with UWY and Ball.
Contractually, we could not deal directly with
Ball since they were a subcontractor of UWY.
Moreover, UWY could not perform an adequate
subcontract monitoring role because the staff was
very "thin" and totally immersed with their work,
and UWY did not have experienced engineers
covering all the necessary disciplines to perform
an adequate monitoring role. To say that we
performed a tight rope act would be an under-
statement.
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Our relationship with UWY and Ball employed
lessons learned from Project Hawkeye, a satellite
developed by Langley with a contract to the
University of Iowa with Ball Aerospace as a
major subcontractor. First, we aggressively dealt
with UWY to define a program that our team
could feel comfortable with, and one which pro-
vided acceptable confidence of success. This
included some tough negotiation in the early days
regarding project staffing; we needed to assure
ourselves that the UWY team possessed the nec-
essary skills and enthusiasm. After these negotia-
tions were completed, we nurtured our UWY
relationships to remove communication barriers
and instill mutual cooperation and support. After
we had gained their confidence and trust, we fol-
lowed the same approach with Ball, with the
blessing of UWY. We strived from the beginning
to develop a clear picture of where we were going
and the approach we wanted to use to get there.
The emphasis was always on what was best for
SAM II. Personal gain was never in the forefront.
On many occasions, we let the contractor take
credit for our ideas, which gave them great incen-
tive to work with us, and then we rolled up our
sleeves to help get the job completed. Although
there were bumps from time to time, the three
teams became one united team, all working
together to do the best job for SAM II.
Differences were resolved by the dedication of
each team member and each organization to make
the necessary sacrifices to do what would be in
the best interest of SAM II.
Often, Government project teams perform a mon-
itoring role in which technical experts are mainly
used to evaluate contractor performance and to
serve as consultants to help solve problems. We
did not monitor our contractor and subcontractor
counterparts, but worked side-by-side to share
responsibilities in all phases of the project. We
had a significant "hands on" role that included
participating in design activities, qualifying hard-
ware at Langley, writing procedures and perform-
ing tests at Ball, performing instrument problem
troubleshooting, etc. We spent nearly as many
hours in the clean room with the instrument as did
the Ball and UWY engineers, and were treated
more like Ball employees when in the plant than
as "customers." UWY and Ball team members
soon learned to respect us as being technical
equals and all "us against them" barriers were
removed. Good rapport with UWY and Ball had a
great side benefit-we always had up-to-date
information.
Using this concept, we were able to develop SAM
II for a much smaller cost than would have been
incurred if we had used the monitoring approach,
since team technical manpower was significantly
increased and very little energy was wasted in
hiding agendas and playing the traditional
Government vs. contractor game of staying at
arm's length. A testimony to the success of our
balancing act is the fact that we were able to cur-
tail Ball and UWY feelings of meddling and
micromanagement and were never seriously
accused of these negative behaviors.
One of the Langley SAM II team members was in
the contractor's plant almost continuously, elimi-
nating the need for an on-site representative.
These trips overlapped, so that status, issues and
concerns of all instrument subsystems could be
relayed by the departing team member to the
arriving team member. At least one of us was
always present during important events, such as
subsystem and system checkout and performance
and qualification testing. Don Hedgepeth lived in
Boulder nearly the entire summer of 1976 helping
with the EM assembly, checkout, performance
testing and flight qualification testing. Ed
Mauldin was once in Boulder for 30 days, waiting
for a high-quality sun to run the final Baseline
Systems Test. We also traveled with the contrac-
tor and subcontractor to vendor facilities to assess
status and perform hardware inspections. This
allowed an independent assessment of vendor-
related issues.
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Regarding change orders, we made clear from the
beginning that unless the contractor saw a direc-
tive in writing from the Contracting Officer, com-
ments heard in brainstorming sessions were not to
be interpreted as directives. All directives went
through the Contracting Officer to the prime con-
tractor, UWY. Before a directive was issued, the
Langley team reviewed it thoroughly with UWY
until we were sure that the directive was clearly
understood. We did not direct the subcontractor,
Ball Aerospace, but they did receive similar
directives from UWY.
Complementary Relationship with
Principal Investigator
We were fortunate to have a very supportive
Principal Investigator in Dr. Pat McCormick. Pat
provided a clear and concise set of science objec-
tives during Pre-Phase A. He provided a major
support role in instrument concept development,
such as data inversion simulations to establish
instrument performance requirements. Pat helped
us evaluate potential instrument concepts during
Phase A an'd helped us conduct tradeoff studies
during Phase B. We kept Pat informed of our
progress, issues and concerns. He fully under-
stood the engineering problems we faced, and
provided relief when we were up against technol-
ogy barriers in Phase C. Together, we refined the
instrument concept during Phase C from a solar
tracking instrument to a solar scanning instru-
ment-a design that simplified the instrument and
significantly improved the accuracy of data inver-
sion. Neither the engineering team nor the science
team would have arrived at this design indepen-
dently, but the team's synergism resulted in an
optimized instrument concept that is still used in
current solar occultation instrument design. Both
science and instrument teams had a relationship
in which each trusted the other to give SAM II
their very best effort. In short, Pat was our great-
est supporter.
m The Langley/Goddard Partnership
Today, new projects take the sister-center rela-
tionship between Langley and Goddard for grant-
ed. It did not start out that way. Traditionally,
Goddard owned all requirements in their pro-
grams, including instrument performance require-
ments. An early Nimbus project manager at
Goddard reminded us of the Golden Rule: "He
who has the gold, rules." We did not accept this
lopsided relationship and insisted on being treated
as an equal partner. First, we worked diligently to
define a boundary between centers, including
explaining our responsibilities, authority, and
development role. Then, we aggressively negoti-
ated with Goddard until Langley ownership of the
SAM II requirements and development approach
was affirmed. Goddard retained ownership of
spacecraft interface requirements and top-level
mission requirements, such as spacecraft orbit
parameters. Eventually, we were treated as peers
and the inter-center relationship became un-
ruffled.
Again, this illustrates how we insisted on princi-
ples now linked to TQM: those doing the work
should be given the responsibility and authority to
produce their products. The ground rules estab-
lished then essentially remain in effect today for
inter-center space flight development programs.
_ii Spacecraft Interface
In the beginning, the Nimbus observatory consist-
ed of nine sophisticated flight instruments that
required a stringent adherence to the initial allo-
cation of the limited spacecraft resources. These
initial budgets were established on March 10,
1975, by the Nimbus Project Office at Goddard,
which was less than two months after SAM II
contract award. The controlling document was the
Sensor Interface Requirements Document
(SIRD). A five-phase delivery of interface materi-
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als was required by the SIRD, with each phase
requiring substantiation that an instrument could
stay within its allocated resources. After March
10, Goddard required monthly review of all
resources.
At one point very early in the program, Goddard
had allocated all weight and power resources and
had no contingency at all. One instrument was
removed from the payload to recover contin-
gency, but adherence to initial budgets continued.
Thus, weight and power were major considera-
tions in selection of technologies, design con-
cepts, and parts used in SAM II. Despite not hav-
ing an instrument configuration when the early
resource allocation and tight resource constraints
were placed, we were able to deliver SAM II
within all spacecraft budgets.
The concepts used by a small core team to suc-
cessfully develop the SAM II instrument, which
has performed in orbit since October 1978, are
summarized below. We could have mentioned
other concepts, but did not want to risk obscuring
the ones we felt were most important. Many of
these concepts are now basic principles of TQM,
but were chosen at the time because they simply
made common sense:
• Management empowerment of the project team
• Adherence to Pre-Phase A, Phase A, Phase B,
and Phase C/D principles
• Engineering model as early proof-of-design
elements
• Attentive risk management
• Strong systems engineering approach
• Effective schedule and cost control
• Small core team backed by experts in the line
organization
• Close-knit project team
• Removal of communication barriers with
contractors
• Frequent visits to contractors
• Clear procedures for directing contractors
• Complementary relationship with the principal
investigator
• Well-defined Langley/Goddard partnership
• Attentiveness to spacecraft interface
• Use of "lessons learned" from previous
projects
• Mentor relationships
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Strategies to Maximize Science Return
by Greg S. Davidson
There is a concern at NASA to learn from the
lessons of the past and to respond to the concerns
of the space science community. We have been
grappling with the problems of:
• Big versus small missions
• Multiple simple spacecraft versus spacecraft
servicing
• A culture of risk avoidance
• Unrealistic budget planning
• Institutional and political forces
• Linkage to the manned space program
As we are in a very dynamic time for space astro-
physics, our discussion must be placed in the con-
text of current events. The missions of the 1980s
have been launched and data is beginning to
arrive. More new astrophysics missions were
expected to be launched between 1991 and the
end of 1993 than in the decade of the 1980s. With
the greater emphasis on long-term operations
designed into several of these recent missions, the
supply of new data should continue to grow. Over
the last several years, the growth in funding for
space astrophysics has exceeded inflation by
roughly 15 percent, and the growth in funding for
science and data analysis is keeping up with the
growth in science data,
There has also been tremendous criticism of the
NASA astrophysics program from the media,
Congress, public and some members of the sci-
ence community. Problems with the Hubble mir-
ror have been fodder for comedians and commen-
tators, while other difficulties such as those with
hydrogen leaks on the Space Shuttle, or the rash
of problems overcome on the Astro mission, have
helped to create a perception of serious problems.
It is always appropriate to review our program-
matic strategies for conducting space astrophysics
in light of experience, and to develop our strategy
for the future. So let us briefly note the recent sci-
entific output of our space astrophysics program,
and then discuss the areas of concern identified
above.
_.','_','-_Status of Astrophysics in
January 1991
Cosmic Background Explorer
(c_ogenically cooled mission complete
November 1990)
• A smooth big bang
• No later bangs
• Unrivaled data from the infrared background
Hubble Space Telescope
(checkout complete, beginning science verifica-
tion and operations)
• Potential black hole in nearby galaxy
• "Circumstellar ring around Supernova 1987a
• Storms on Saturn
• High-resolution imagery of Pluto and Charon
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Roentgen Satellite
(survey complete - U.S. observation time begun
February)
• 80,000 new X-ray sources
• 1,000 new extreme ultraviolet sources
Astro/BBXRT
(mission complete December 1990-data being
analyzed)
• Results to come...
Recent and Upcoming Science Missions
• Gamma Ray Observatory (1991)
• Array of Low-Energy X-ray Imaging Sensors
(1991)
• Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer (1991)
• Solar-A/Soft X-ray Telescope/ISAS (1991)
• ASTRO-SPAS/Orbiting and Retrievable Far
and Extreme Ultraviolet Spectrometer/ESA
(1992)
• Diffuse X-ray Spectrometer (1992)
• KONUS/WlND (1992)
• Solar, Anomalous, and Magnetospheric
Particle Explorer (1992)
• Astro-D/Spectroscopic X-ray
Observatory/ISAS (1993)
• HST Wide Field and Planetary Camera II
(1993)
• Spectrum-X-Gamma/USSR (1993)
- All-sky monitor
- Stellar X-ray Polarirneter
During the next several years, some of the other
areas of substantial work will include the
Advanced X-ray Astrophysical Facility, the X-ray
Timing Explorer, the Shuttle test of the Gravity
Probe-B instrument, the Submillimeter Wave
Astronomical Satellite, additional HST replace-
ment instruments, instruments for the European
X-ray Multi-Mirror mission, support for the
Russian Radioastron mission and the Japanese
VLBI Space Observatory Program, and definition
work on the Space Infrared Telescope Facility, the
Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared
Astronomy, and the Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic
Explorer. Rocket, balloon and airborne activities
will continue, as will data analysis from previous-
ly flown missions.
F
_.,¢,_Big and Small Space Missions
The scientific rationale for a mix of big, moderate
and small missions in a balanced program of
astrophysics is that there is no optimal mission
size to address the incredible variety of scientific
phenomena we wish to investigate. In practice,
mission size is scaled down to the lowest level
required to fulfill the science goals. The U.S. is
unique in its capability to conduct science mis-
sions that require the largest observatories, but
these observatories are balanced by many smaller
efforts in our overall program of space astro-
physics research. A diversity of missions also
helps to develop and maintain our institutional
capability to carry out scientific investigations
today and in the future. Diversity in mission size
supports a variety of implementation strategies,
and it helps establish a broad portfolio of mis-
sions that can help weather unanticipated and
adverse external events.
The temas we use to describe programs may pre-
sent a misleading perspective to mission size. In
one sense, Congress categorizes the entire physics
and astronomy budget, which includes astro-
physics, space physics, and Shuttle payload mis-
sion management, as a single item in the budget.
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The Congress holds NASA to an operating plan
that has the Explorers as a single activity, and
even within the other parts of NASA the Small
Explorers are seen as a single project. To get a
sensible understanding of our real mission diver-
sity, we focus on the fundamental nature of each
astrophysics activity and not on a bureaucratic
categorization.
Small missions such as the Small Explorers and
suborbital activities with balloon and rocket pay-
loads provide special opportunities and advan-
tages. Similar opportunities are currently avail-
able on the Kuiper Airborne Observatory, and
they will eventually be available on the moderate
Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared
Astronomy (SOFIA) mission. Small missions are
more readily suitable for rapid and flexible
response to unforeseen opportunities, and help
provide continuity and stability to a given science
discipline and opportunities for training new sci-
entists and instrumentalists.
However, bigness and smallness may be attribut-
es of the same mission. Recently, several interna-
tional opportunities on major foreign missions
have been pursued to support small American
teams with unique technical abilities, to the bene-
fit of both the American space science communi-
ty and to the international scientific community as
a whole. NASA support of the activities associat-
ed with the study of Supernova 1987a demon-
strated the coordination of many big, moderate
and small mission assets to rapidly pursue an
unanticipated scientific opportunity. For observa-
tion of SN1987a, guest observer support on IUE
and Astro-C/Ginga was combined with suborbital
observations, including use of a detector system
from the Gamma Ray Observatory, which was
flown on a balloon!
In the $100-million-plus class of moderate mis-
sions are the Delta-class Explorers such as
EUVE, XTE, and FUSE, as well as replacement
instruments for HST such as the NICMOS and
STIS. Approximately six to eight opportunities
for this class of mission are currently budgeted
for the decade of the 1990s. It is analytically use-
ful to think of the combination of Delta-class
Explorers and observatory replacement instru-
ments as a single class of mission. In assessing
scientific priorities, it may be useful to compare
whether $100 million spent on another instrument
for the HST or AXAF focal plane will provide
more or less benefit than the next mission in the
Explorer queue. (In actuality, these two types of
missions are funded from different accounts, so
transfer is not likely.)
From this perspective, it appears that the benefits
attributed to small missions can come in big
packages. In order to penetrate the fundamental
issue underlying this discussion, we must sharpen
our definition of big and small. What precisely do
we want from our small missions? Is it opportuni-
ties for hardware development at small institu-
tions? Is it to fund a greater number of science
subdisciplines? Is it providing maximum access
to space astrophysics data to the widest possible
range of the science community? Is it the ability
to respond rapidly to unexpected scientific oppor-
tunities? Is it to increase launch rate?
Figure 1, a representation of the current diversity
in astrophysics efforts, reflects the difficulties in
categorizing missions by the size of their total
development budget.
While the HEAO missions required large-scale
hardware development efforts, it does not make
sense to categorize the current archival data activ-
ities on HEAO as a big mission. How then should
data archive activities on Hubble or GRO be
characterized? While there is no debate that XTE
is a moderate mission and not a large one, how
does this $100-million-class instrument devel-
oped to be installed on-orbit on the Explorer
Platform differ from the $100-million-class
Hubble replacement instruments? Some have sug-
gested that the issue is one of risk: a large number
of small activities all dependent on a single
spacecraft might all be destroyed by a single
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BIG
HARDWARE
DEVELOPMENT
($500m+ total)
(40% of FY 1991)
HST Operations (45)
HST Servicing (40)
GRO Develop (22)
^AXAF(125)
SIRTF studies (8)
MODERATE
HARDWARE
DEVELOPMENT
($50-$500M total)
(21% of FY 1991)
EUVE/Platform (26)
HST WFff'C II (25)
HST NICMOS (-15)
HST STIS (-15)
HST ORU (5)
XTE (16)
STORE/GP-B (23)
64CE studies (1)
^FUSE studies (1)
SOFIA studies (1)
SMALL
HARDWARE
DEVELOPMENT
(<$50M total)
(12% of FY 1991)
KAO (10)
Rockets (3)
Balloons (3)
ORFEUS (.5)
ORFEUS-Jenkins (.2)
SAMPEX (14)
CRIE (.2)
Astro-D (3)
SXT (3)
SXG/MOXE (1)
SXG/SXRP (1)
^Radioastron (1)
XMM (6)
LAGEOS-3 (. l)
KONUS (.2)
AFAS'I" (8)
^SWAS (6)
IR Tech/SIRTF (6)
^HETE (.6)
ATD (2)
Atlas-FAUST {.2}
NON-HARDWARE
ACTIVITY
(27% of FY 1991)
Grants Programs (14)
Long Term Program (4)
Theory (4)
Data Program (6)
Data Systems (2)
^HST Data Analysis (20)
HST DADS (11)
HST Institute (34)
^GRO MO&DA (16)
HEAO MO&DA (2)
IUE MO&DA (7)
IRAS/IPAC MO&DA (7)
COBE MO&DA (10)
ASTRO/BBXRT {5}
Ginga MO&DA (.5)
Hipparcos MO&DA (.3)
ROSAT MO&DA (7)
IRTS (.4)
SXG/EUVITA (.1)
ISO co-I's (.2)
KONUS (.2)
Cassini Gravity Exp. {.ll
^ = 50% or more growth planned for FY 1992
(#) = FY 1991 funding in millions
Program in italics = Astrophysics not primary science
{$} = not funded by Astrophysics Division
Figure 1. Astrophysics Program
meteoroid. If this is the true pivot upon which the
big versus small issue turns, then size becomes a
secondary matter and risk becomes our key
concern.
Many of the types of opportunities in space astro-
physics that we wish to make available are deliv-
ered by small missions and by a large mission
such as HST. A moderate mission program is
embedded in Hubble replacement instruments,
allowing for new teams from different science
disciplines to build and fly new instruments.
Hubble brings a massive increase in the number
of small grants for guest observations and
archival research to support a broader astro-
physics community (including amateur
Diversity-FY 1991 "Snapshot"
astronomers) than ever before. Even with the
problems to date, and on-orbit checkout not com-
plete, Hubble demonstrated part of its planned
versatility as a long-term observational asset in
space when it captured Saturn's recent storm.
Finally, the value of increased launch rate must be
assessed in the context of risk management and
single versus multiple spacecraft strategies to
conduct scientific missions.
Our current program combines serviceable and
non-serviceable observatories in concert with
small and moderate-sized missions in the
Explorer program, plus support for missions of
opportunity: rocket, balloon and aircraft pro-
grams. Existing technology development,
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research and analysis, guest observer and archival
research programs round out the currently avail-
able astrophysics opportunities. While the diver-
sity in scale of missions is not entirely under our
control, we do believe that this combination
meets the wide range of needs of the community
as they have been expressed to us. Are we correct
in this assessment? Some are asking for a greater
emphasis on smaller missions in the future. What
type of service, product, opportunity or efficiency
should be pursued? We welcome further discus-
sion of this issue.
E[ Single vs. Multiple Spacecraft in
Conducting Missions
There are cost and benefit tradeoffs associated
with the strategy in which missions are designed
to be conducted by a single complex spacecraft
rather than several simpler spacecraft. The most
cogent examples of the single complex spacecraft
missions are HST and AXAF, and since they rep-
resent half of the Great Observatories, question-
ing the fundamental strategy they embody could
provide enormously important insights.
HST and AXAF are not merely large and com-
plex observatories, but they are also serviceable
observatories. They reflect a strategy to provide
15 years of on-orbit lifetime through regular
replacement of instruments and other hardware.
In contrast, the strategy to provide a similar on-
orbit lifetime for the Tracking and Data Relay
Satellite System (TDRSS) and the Earth
Observing System (EOS) involves development
of a series of replacement spacecraft on a regular
basis. The intent of the servicing strategy is to
optimize costs for long-term missions that require
an expensive spacecraft (such as HST or AXAF
with their large precise optics), and that can also
operate in a Shuttle-accessible orbit. TDRSS
requires a geosynchronous orbit and EOS
requires a polar orbit. Neither TDRSS nor EOS
have structural elements analogous to HST or
AXAF optics.
The comparison above points to two strategic rea-
sons to use a single, serviceable spacecraft to
achieve long life, and to reap the benefits from
sharing critical infrastructure. But at what cost?
The complexity of a single mission raises costs
and increases the required development time,
which increases costs further.
While a single spacecraft approach is more vul-
nerable to an irreparable system single-point fail-
ure, servicing provides a programmatic means to
regularly repair subsystem failures. The only pre-
vious astrophysics missions on a scale even
roughly analogous to HST were the Orbiting
Astrophysical Observatory (OAO) and the High
Energy Astrophysics Observatory (HEAO) series.
Two of the four OAO spacecraft failed, one from
a launch failure and another on the second day of
the mission from a power problem. All three of
the HEAO missions were launched and operated
successfully for approximately two years. Of
course, it was expensive to build serviceability
into HST and to purchase the first set of replace-
ment hardware, but the cost to build, launch and
operate in the early 1960s would equal $2.4 bil-
lion in 1993 dollars. The life cycle costs of HST,
including six Shuttle flights at $350 million each,
is a little over three times that amount. For com-
parative purposes, the HEAO lifecycle cost
through the two years of operations was $130
million. Is there disagreement that the expected
15-year scientific return of HST will easily sur-
pass that of HEAO and OAO, even in the context
of a much advanced technological state-of-
the-art?
Multiple missions provide a certain "safety in
numbers" for launch vehicle or other flaws, but
numbers provide no easy fix to generic failures. If
we had built two simple HSTs, both primary mir-
rors would likely have been distorted by the same
faulty null corrector. Since the most cost-effective
way to build multiple spacecraft is to have one
roughly one to two years ahead of the other, the
second Hubble in this example would have been
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essentially completed at the time the problem was
identified in orbit. In that scenario, repairing the
mirror on the ground could easily take as long
and be as expensive as the fixes we are imple-
menting today for the real HST.
We must also be careful in using launch rate as a
surrogate measure for scientific productivity.
Launching five simpler Hubbles with one instru-
ment each might have resulted in a higher flight
rate, but the number of launch vehicles by itself
does not increase productivity. Implicit in a strat-
egy of flying single multi-instrument spacecraft
rather than many single-instrument spacecraft is a
lower launch rate. Since a launch itself does not
yield science, we have to look for some other
measure of scientific productivity that is correlat-
ed with flight rate. What are the appropriate ways
to measure scientific value: launch rate, number
of instruments, weight of instruments, observa-
tion time, data returned, refereed publications,
new knowledge?
A problem with slow programs is that we do not
reap critical information for many years. While
this is of most concern in the scientific arena, it
also hinders the expansion of our knowledge of
how to conduct space science missions. HST is
our first experiment with a planned spacecraft
servicing strategy, and as a pathfinder it will wind
up costing more than programs that can benefit
from Hubble's servicing lessons learned. HST
was begun in an environment where almost week-
ly Shuttle flights were anticipated. Throughout
the development period, as we have learned about
the Shuttle and what it can do, the HST servicing
strategy has shifted and adapted. After less than a
year on-orbit, we have a small but real database
on actual mission events and the programmatic
flexibility servicing provides to accommodate
them. Servicing will enable key fixes to HST
solar arrays and optics, but are these advantages
enough to justify the extra expenses? Adopting an
empirical approach, let's see the data, let's discuss
it, and let's see what we can learn from it.
_ Risk-taking and Risk Avoidance
Can we change the environment to support a level
of risk-taking that will increase the long-term
efficiency of our space science expenditures? It
would be almost impossible to make state-of-the-
art spacecraft so reliable that we could be 100
percent certain that there are no technical risks,
and even if we could do this, the last bit of relia-
bility would probably cost a lot. A cheaper and
more practical approach that NASA has
employed is to design our difficult missions to
provide additional capability or flexibility that
enables us to survive unanticipated problems. If
we then can build that mission cheaper, we are
getting more science for the dollar.
However, a strategy that includes some risk-tak-
ing has one critical implication-sometimes fail-
ures happen. The problem with risk-taking strate-
gies is that NASA, Congress, the science commu-
nity, and the general public are usually unwilling
to accept failures. NASA provides a symbol of
American technological excellence; thus, NASA
successes and failures have a context that exceeds
science return for the dollar. NASA receives the
budget that it does partly because of this symbol-
ism in the minds of members of Congress and
their constituents, but NASA's stature also com-
plicates our simple cost-benefit analysis. Imagine
an airline that decided that the strategy to yield
the most cost-effective transportation for the dol-
lar would be to reduce safety to the expected
fatality level associated with driving a car. Even if
this decision could be implemented, what would
happen after the first crash?
The Hubble mirror aberration was tragic, but it
was also typical of many spacecraft failures in
that it was from an utterly unexpected source. But
unlike previous missions, the HST program strat-
egy was failure-resilient. On-orbit servicing pro-
vides the programmatic flexibility through which
even this utterly unexpected technical problem
can be addressed and corrected. From a program
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perspective, we will have an observatory that will
be less than expected for three years, but for the
remaining 12 years should live up to its full
potential. Nevertheless, the failure in the mirror
fabrication has had a profound and fundamental
impact on the science community, the public, the
Congress and on all of us here.
It is still possible to have a strategy that involves
risks, and NASA does designate payloads in one
of several categories depending on the level of
risk deemed appropriate. Planetary missions are
Class A, with requirements to use only the best
possible parts and the greatest level of redundan-
cy. Recently, the AXAF spacecraft (with a few
exceptions) was deemed to be a Class B mission,
in part because of the additional flexibility pro-
vided by servicing. The recent Astro flight on the
Shuttle Columbia, like many other Shuttle-
attached payloads, was developed as a Class C
mission.
We agree that failure-resilient strategies should be
pursued. So how are we going to change the envi-
ronment so that there will be support for these
strategies? In the abstract, few would disagree.
The challenge is to look for ways to enlist and
maintain the support for programmatic flexibility
and risk-taking even after a failure occurs. If we
cannot accept failures of any sort, the cost of mis-
sions will inevitably rise.
_ Budget "Realism" and Strategies to
Optimize Financial Risk
How do you estimate the cost of something that
has never been done before? NASA starts out
with several simultaneous approaches. NASA and
contract engineers develop what is known as a
"grassroots estimate," in which the working level
people estimate their own effort required, and
these estimates are aggregated. Although it is crit-
ical to have the input from the people who will
actually do the job, there are also some problems
inherent in a grassroots estimate. Those people do
not yet know how they are going to overcome the
unique challenges associated with the missions
that yield the state-of-the-art science we are usu-
ally pursuing. There is usually some optimism on
the part of the engineers, and it is difficult for a
grassroots estimate to properly account for the
aggregate effect of complex interactions of sepa-
rate groups working on difficult tasks. So in par-
allel with a grassroots estimate, a parametric esti-
mate is made using statistical inference based on
previous mission experience. By using factors
such as subsystem weight or complexity and mis-
sion type (such as cryogenically cooled, super
lightweight planetary probe, or low Earth orbiting
instrument platform), a budget estimate is
developed.
The grassroots and parametric estimates are then
compared, the information from both estimates is
presented, and a single budget estimate is devel-
oped for the project. This budget estimate (along
with the associated technical and scientific plan
for accomplishing the mission) are then reviewed
by a team of "non-advocates" who scrutinize the
plans and assumptions of the new project, as well
as the grassroots and parametric estimates under-
lying the assumptions.
Given all of this knowledge, some of it contradic-
tory, what budget estimate should be sent to the
Office of Management and Budget? If NASA
requests a very high budget, we increase the
chance that we will look good later, because the
chance of overrun is reduced. There is less stress
on NASA managers when you have a lot of
money for your project. At the same time, there is
probably some price at which a program is too
expensive to be funded (although it is hard to
know what that really is). Another problem is that
NASA budgets are a matter of public knowledge,
and so all of the contractors know your program's
funding. A comfortably large budget can become
a tempting target, and so you may find the effort
on your mission growing to fit the available
budget.
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The balance to be struck is to propose a budget
which is achievable without being comfortable,
and then to monitor and track all changes from
this original baseline. Over time, your initial
baseline (based on grassroots and parametric esti-
mates) will be modified by contractor bids and
negotiated settlements, design reviews, experi-
ence with fabrication, assembly and test, and all
of the other activities associated with conducting
a space science mission. Increases in cost will be
of two sorts. Where we have misestimated costs,
we request what is known at NASA as a
"reprice"-more money to do the same work.
Contractor overruns are a subset of repricings,
because programs tend to budget for more than
the dollar value of the contract to protect against
overrun. Only when these reserves are depleted
will the program request a repricing to cover a
contractor overrun. Sometimes in the develop-
ment of a mission, we learn that a new activity is
required to accomplish the mission, or that spend-
ing additional funds to develop a new capability
may yield sufficient return to justify the invest-
ment. Additional funds to do new work is refen'ed
to as an augmentation or as additional scope.
Twice every year NASA formally reviews the
budgets of all of our missions to anticipate pend-
ing problems, to assess problems that have been
identified, and to look for areas where new scope
might bring large benefits. It is not entirely a
zero-sum competition between these programs for
additional funds, but the pressure to make trade-
offs is always there. Within some programs the
tradeoffs are internal, and no additional funds are
requested. If this is not possible, we must priori-
tize any annual requests for additional funds. It
might look better if there were never any requests
for additional funding-hypothetically, NASA
would quote a price and come back years later
with a spacecraft. But how would we know what
price to quote? We could keep eliminating parts
of the program to fit within the initial estimate, or
we could ask for a high enough budget that we
could afford anything. The way the process works
now, we make those choices, but we do so incre-
mentally over the life of the missions. Every year
our information gets better on what each mission
needs and what is possible to accomplish. Most of
our effort, and that of our contractors, is dedicated
towards learning about the mission and the hard-
ware that can accomplish it-the materials, fabri-
cation and assembly of spacecraft are a minor
part of our expenses. If our management at
NASA Headquarters is to be based on the science
and engineering fundamentals of the missions we
are conducting, our management and budgeting
must also be a continuous and incremental
process. Of course, as our projects and contrac-
tors will tell you, this does not mean that we treat
budget growth kindly. We must treat an increase
in one area as if it were a cut to another, because
sometimes that is exactly what we have to do.
We must also counter the tendency towards a
focus on the short term, an orientation which is
shared by the stock market and indeed with much
of our current national character. Congress votes
NASA its budget one year at a time. Unlike the
private sector, we cannot borrow money from a
bank even if it will yield an enormous benefit
downstream. The only source of funds in a given
year for a new requirement in one mission is to
take the money from another. Consequently,
everyone's concern is drawn towards the current
year's budget (which we are spending), and the
next year's budget (which is at OMB or Congress
where tradeoffs are being considered). Funding
for the next four years beyond that is controlled at
OMB, but there is a tendency not to focus on
these "outyears." Unfortunately, our overall sci-
entific productivity depends on choices made
throughout the life cycle of our missions. When
we develop missions for 15 years of operational
life, and 30 years of data analysis to follow, a
short-term perspective will not work.
We have a sign on the wall around here: "If
everyone keeps saying 'screw the outyears,'
eventually we will all live in outyears that some-
one else has screwed." For long-term missions,
this means we must expand our vision even
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beyond the five-year horizon typically used for
planning. The science return on our missions
must be weighed against life cycle costs, and if
we only focus on the narrow window of the
development period, we are likely to make trade-
offs that optimize costs in the short run but are a
net loss overall. We have learned the value and
insights that come from this perspective in plan-
ning the 15-year Hubble operational lifetime, and
we plan on implementing the same scope of
vision on AXAF. Today's estimates for AXAF
operations in the period from 1998 to 2013 must
necessarily be soft, but by attempting to track the
implications of today's decisions across a mission
lifetime, we hope to make decisions that will look
as good in retrospect as they do in formulation.
I would also like to raise the controversial
premise that part of the "realism" of budget plan-
ning depends on an assessment of appropriate
financial risk-taking. The problem is analogous to
the question of optimizing insurance coverage. If
we could reduce the number of programs under
development and thereby increase the reserves on
each, we could reduce the odds of an overrun on
each of our missions. Indeed, the incentive on the
individual managers who are responsible for a
single project is to be as conservative as possi-
ble-to take no financial risks. But at Headquarters
our job is different. Our goal is to maximize sci-
ence return for the dollar. This creates a natural
dynamic: the project manager is looking to opti-
mize on behalf of a specific mission, while
Headquarters makes tradeoffs between missions
and levels of risk. If we are always cutting and
delaying every program, the level of risk is too
high. If we never have to make a tradeoff between
programs, the level of risk we are taking is proba-
bly too low. This raises the question: Are we tak-
ing the wrong level of financial risk?
Unfortunately, while the downside costs of taking
risks are very visible (project cuts or slips), the
benefits are not as easily traceable. The quick
response to Supernova 1987a was funded by
stripping funding flexibility and thus taking
financial risks across the board. In 1988, while
AXAF was sent as a new start in the proposed
budget to Capitol Hill, we turned down a request
from the HST project for $50 million of addition-
al reserves on development activity. We took
what we felt was an appropriate level of risk on
HST, independent of concerns for the pending
AXAF decision. If we had insisted on having the
extra reserves as insurance, it may well have pre-
vented us from starting AXAF that year. We were
correct in our assessment that HST development
effort did not require the extra reserves to accom-
modate the problems they were concerned with at
that time, but the benefit to astrophysics and
space science from this type of risk-taking is usu-
ally not as visible as the costs.
One negative aspect of a risk-sharing strategy is
that the severe problems in one mission spread
across a range of programs. A defining attribute
of the Explorer program is that individual projects
have reserves that are much lower than usual for
other NASA flight programs, and that problems
are accommodated within queues. The mission
development and launch vehicle problems of the
mid-1980s have stretched out the Delta-class
Explorer queue to the point where the next mis-
sion under development, the X-ray Timing
Explorer, was selected 14 years ago. Is this delay
acceptable? If not, should we begin to emphasize
flight rate more strongly above science perfor-
mance in Delta-class developments? Should we
also wait longer before starting Explorers to
increase the likelihood that stable funding will be
available?
A particular fear concerning this risk-sharing
strategy is that problems in one big project can
decimate many other small projects. Put different-
ly, risk-sharing is not appealing to the many if
there is one elephant and a lot of mice. However,
the existence of several observatories at different
stages of their life cycles creates a separate field
for elephants, so sensible risk-sharing is now pos-
sible. In FY 1991 Congress provided an addition-
al $30 million for HST, but also levied a similar
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reduction that was borne by AXAF. It was deeply
disturbing to have to upset the AXAF baseline;
we are aware of the inefficiency that funding
changes can cause. Nevertheless, we cannot
afford to regularly carry reserves to insure against
major unanticipated crises such as the HST spher-
ical aberration. If we had carried an extra $30
million of reserves for Hubble over the past three
or four years, these funds would have remained
wastefully idle (or worse yet, they would have
been spent inefficiently merely because they were
available). We had low reserves on Hubble but
sufficient funding to support several years of
AXAF mirror definition and development work.
Were these the right choices? At the time our
assessment of financial risk appeared sound. We
also recognize that this is not a clear-cut case
because, as events unfolded, we were hit by a
more pessimistic scenario than we had planned
for. Nevertheless, in retrospect we believe that the
overall science productivity has been increased
b_, these choices. In terms of the broader inquiry
of operating strategies, the more fundamental
questions are whether such financial risk-based
strategies are appropriate, and if so, are there fur-
ther principles or guidance to improve the
process?
The problem of financial risk-sharing, as with any
risk-based strategy, is that it is difficult to take a
broad perspective. There is a cognitive bias in
human judgment of risks which has been empiri-
cally demonstrated. Negative events resonate far
more loudly than positive ones. McCray and
Stern ["NASA's Space Science Program: The
Vision and the Reality" (1991)] express a concern
that the cost of accommodating spherical aberra-
tion on HST "may raid small, individual investi-
gator groups of development funds." This fear
has a basis in the memory of the so-called
"slaughter of the innocents" in 1983 and 1984
when Hubble development problems were solved
by cuts primarily from small mission efforts in
astrophysics and other science disciplines. These
were truly tragic cuts that caused real damage to
individual scientists and teams. Psychologically,
the impact of these cuts resonates very deeply.
The actual level of reduction was 8 percent of
non-Hubble astrophysics in 1983 and 1984, and
there has not been a hit on small missions caused
by big ones since, but the concern remains
because the "slaughter of the innocents" is such a
powerful and psychological force in shaping our
cognition of risks.
We believe that by establishing one risk pool for
large missions and another for small missions, we
make it possible to make efficient use of risk-
sharing, which yields the maximum amount of
science productivity without threatening the
"innocents." Inside a single risk pool, a major
unanticipated problem such as the HST aberration
threatens AXAF, but future AXAF problems may
also be weighed against HST funding. It is natural
to have a general concern that Hubble will contin-
ue to need more and more funding, because that
has happened on several occasions. At the same
time, the HST Science Institute was specifically
created as part of a strategy to counter the institu-
tional tendency of NASA to underinvest in oper-
ating missions in favor of new development activ-
ity. In general, we want to provide sufficient
reserves to our programs so that they can accom-
modate a nominal range of problems. In our
assessment, it is not efficient to provide insurance
in the form of reserves to cover very pessimistic
scenarios. Since pessimistic scenarios do occur
occasionally, we will sometimes be forced to
trade off priorities between missions in the same
risk pool. We intend to make these tradeoffs in
the context of the priorities established (and regu-
larly reiterated) with the science community.
Should we be more risk averse? Holding higher
reserves means responding less quickly to oppor-
tunities and starting fewer missions. Remember,
our risk posture is not the only factor that can
influence funding. These have been our choices
to date, but we welcome dialogue on this issue.
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]W Institutional and Political
C on st raints/Forces
Institutional constraints sometimes prevent
NASA from achieving the best possible science
for the dollar. While we do not have the authority
to change many of the rules under which we oper-
ate, it is worthwhile to discuss the institutional
setting of NASA space science because solutions
may exist; we may just not see them.
The budget process takes about two years, of
which more than half is activity outside NASA by
Congress and the Administration. Space science
experience has shown that reliable cost estimates
are frequently difficult to make until you have
already invested about 10 percent of the develop-
ment cost in definition. However, if we wait until
that level of definition and then begin the budget
process, we are adding a substantial delay to the
program. And once a program is inserted into the
budget process, that is no guarantee it will emerge
successfully. We have adopted and implemented a
strategy embodied in the OSSA Strategic Plan
which tries to prioritize and sequence major new
starts for a period of several years in order to
focus our resources on a few key mission candi-
dates and reduce the complexity of tradeoffs once
missions are proposed within the budget process.
This strategic planning avoids some types of inef-
ficiency, but inevitable time lags remain in the
system.
National political forces sometimes favor highly
visible-thereby large-space mission. As public
and private individuals pursuing government-sup-
ported space science, we are in a bind. The
Executive and Congressional process by which
the U.S. approves scientific investigations pro-
vides the fundamental legitimacy we have to do
our jobs. At the same time, institutions and
processes can tend towards certain results by
virtue of their structure. If in fact there is an insti-
tutional predisposition towards large missions in
the space mission approval process, then the
sources of that structural preference must be
specifically identified and countered. Otherwise,
the science administrator who proposes a pro-
gram of space research that includes fewer large
missions and more small missions is likely to lose
in the competitive budget arena to others who
cater to the existing bureaucratic and political
tendencies.
While the current complement of space science
missions presents a diversity of large and small
science, it is possible that it is not the right mix.
The institutional and political process is shaped
by the actions and contributions of both public
and private space scientists, engineers and man-
agers. The process begins with mission proposals
from the scientific community and ends with
Congressional approval. If the system has a bias
towards bigness, what specific changes can we
make or promote to get the system to support the
optimal size diversity for space missions? What
actions can we take today? How shall we plan to
address this issue over time?
_ Linkage to the Manned Space
Program
There is a major role in space science for
unmanned missions, and we take advantage of the
opportunities available. Smaller Explorers have
always used expendable launch vehicles, as do
even smaller rocket experiments. As experience
teaches us more about the capabilities of the
Space Shuttle, science mission strategies have
been shaped to optimize their mission within the
envelope of possibilities. The experience of
Challenger and the evolution of the space launch
arena since that time have taught us that the
Shuttle is generally not an appropriate launcher
for larger Explorers. COBE and EUVE had to be
redesigned for launch on expendable vehicles, at
a significant cost. XTE is planned for Shuttle
launch and on-orbit installation on EUVE's
Explorer Platform; based on our cur,'ent invest-
ments and options, the servicing strategy embod-
ied in a reusable platform is still the most cost-
effective way to pursue the XTE mission. FUSE
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is further downstream, and the continuation of
this Explorer Platform strategy should be careful-
ly assessed, based on our experience to date and
the existence of alternatives. Other Explorers are
planned for unmanned vehicles.
Despite the changes in the Shuttle program since
the initiation of HST development, that on-orbit
observatory is poised to take full advantage of the
manned space program in pursuing its 15-year
science mission. The Space Infrared Telescope
Facility (SIRTF) was originally designed to be a
Shuttle attached payload. When Shuttle flight
experience indicated the existence of an orbital
phenomenon (atomic oxygen glow), the Shuttle
Infrared Telescope Facility was changed into a
free-flying spacecraft to fulfill the mission needs.
Later study has revealed that a 100,000-kilometer
orbit optimizes the SIRTF mission return, and so
now the current baseline is for launch on a Titan
IV unmanned vehicle. There was no institutional
resistance to this change, and we intend to contin-
ue making launch vehicle choices on the basis of
science priorities and cost effectiveness.
Current budgeting policy does not charge differ-
ential costs to account for the differences between
expendable launch vehicles and the Space
Shuttle. Unfortunately, the very fact that the
Shuttle is not expendable makes it very hard to
calculate the appropriate cost of a single flight. In
terms of the expendable fuels used and flight-spe-
cific effort, the cost of flying six Shuttle flights in
a year instead of five is very small (closer to $40
million than the $600 million cost estimate that
some members of the science community have
used). In economic terms, the variable costs are
insignificant when compared to the fixed costs. A
greater share of the cost of using a Shuttle flight
is due to another economic concept: opportunity
cost. If we were to change our minds and launch
SIRTF inside a Shuttle, we would have to push
some other payload off the manifest. (Of course,
some payloads require only partial use of the pay-
load bay and mission timeline.) The value of
opportunity cost would depend on the importance
of the payload to be replaced. We are also not
amortizing the development of the Shuttle in our
costs above (nor that of ICBMs upon which our
fleet of expendable vehicles is based), because
the final economic principle which we are pursu-
ing is that sunk costs should not be considered in
making today's choices: we want the most cost-
effective way of accomplishing the science mis-
sions we are pursuing.
The dialogue should not stop here. We are
attempting to pursue better operating strategies to
address some of the important problems that have
been raised by members of the space astrophysics
community. As these efforts progress, we will
want to examine their effectiveness, adopt and
improve what is successful, and change what is
not working. Other key issues remain unan-
swered, and while some of the institutional prob-
lems appear inevitable and unchangeable, we
should be wary of complaisance. If we are doing
something that can be done better another way,
we should try the better way. America's space sci-
ence program yields benefits to all of us, and it is
the duty of those entrusted with conducting this
exploration of the universe to grapple with our
common challenges and surmount them.
Efforts to understand and to maximize science
return have continued. Over the past two and a
half years since this was written, the strategy for
both XTE and AXAF has been changed from the
Shuttle servicing mode, with AXAF split into two
smaller, cheaper spacecraft. HST remains on
schedule for Shuttle servicing missions in
December 1993 and March 1997. Institutional
factors now appear to be shifting towards small
missions over large ones. Hopefully, this trend
will not be simply an exchange of one inappropri-
ate bias for another, but rather an opening of a
wider variety of alternatives from which we can
pursue the optimum.
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Human Needs, Motivation, and
the Results of the NASA Culture Surveys
by Mario H. Castro-Cedeno
An organization is defined by Mondy et al.
(p. 198) as two or more people working together
in a coordinated manner to achieve group results.
When run well, an organization will provide syn-
ergism to the activities and efforts of its members.
Through division of labor and specialization, the
members can contribute their individual skills,
expertise and effort toward accomplishing goals
that are far beyond the capability of any single
individual. Modem research and engineering pro-
jects would not be possible without large organi-
zations because both specialization and coopera-
tion are essential in addressing the complex and
interdisciplinary problems of the modem world.
Unfortunately, the act of organizing can inhibit or
limit individual behavior, working conditions and
job satisfaction. Sometimes the limitations are
easy to see or discover and are not difficult to
understand. That is the case with working hours
and office space. In other cases, such as status
and rank, they are much more difficult to interpret
because they are the result of complex cultural
interactions. Wage scales and the apportionment
of fringe benefits are examples of limitations that
have both a cultural and an economic origin.
The limitations that an organization member
encounters in the workplace may come from
experience that has been codified and formalized
into policies and procedures. Or they may be part
of the unwritten corporate culture and folklore.
Limitations may sometimes arise when responsi-
bilities are transferred from the corporate entity to
its representatives. In all effective organizations,
members voluntarily give up some of their indi-
viduality and freedom for the common good.
The limitations that an organization imposes on
its members can cause dissatisfaction and may
produce unhappy employees who will not partici-
pate to the extent of their potential in achieving
the organization's goals and mission. This loss of
interest is called "demotivation" (Mondy, 300). If
the dissatisfaction pervades an organization, the
inefficient use of the human resources will lead to
poor organizational performance. Thus, a project
manager must understand and minimize these
demotivators.
But even eliminating all the demotivators, or
sources of dissatisfaction, may not result in moti-
vated employees. Motivation, which is defined as
the desire to put forth effort in pursuit of organi-
zational objectives (Mondy, 292), is a higher goal
than avoiding dissatisfaction. What causes moti-
vation must also be understood because maintain-
ing employee morale and motivation is an impor-
tant project management duty.
g_
_ Scientific Management
The systematic study of the factors that enhance
workplace efficiency is called scientific manage-
ment. It had its origins in the work of Frederick
Taylor at the beginning of this century. He and his
followers advocated systematizing efficient work
procedures by using the scientific method to ana-
lyze management problems and situations.
In a classical application of scientific manage-
ment, Taylor studied the pig iron operation of
13ethlehem Steel Company (Taylor, 41-47). He
used what are now known as time-and-motion
studies to determine that the average worker out-
put was 12.5 tons per person per day. He then
prescribed more efficient work methods and stan-
dardized rest periods. The result was that average
output rose to 48 tons per person per day. The
additional efficiency, combined with a new incen-
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tive pay system that he also proposed, increased
the worker's daily pay from $1.15 to $1.85. Thus,
both the organization and its members benefited
from Taylor's work.
Taylor's followers embraced his methods and
techniques, and for some time it was thought that
scientific management was all that was needed to
improve the efficiency of any organization, espe-
cially those involved in manufacturing. They per-
formed time-and-motion studies to develop effi-
cient work procedures and labor-saving tools, and
then directed employees in a rational and scien-
tific way.
Beginning in 1924, Elton Mayo and others per-
formed a series of studies at the Western Electric
Company's plant in Hawthorne, on Chicago's
west side (Mondy, 68). One study looked at how
lighting affects worker productivity. Illumination
was first increased to extreme brightness, and
then it was reduced in stages to the point where
materials could hardly be seen. Workers main-
tained or even exceeded their original output.
Similar results were obtained for wage incentive,
supervision styles, length and frequency of rest
periods, and length of the work week.
The Hawthorne study led Mayo to speculate that
something other than the variables under investi-
gation was having an effect on worker productivi-
ty. While observing and interviewing the workers,
he noticed that merely by participating in the
experiment they felt special. Their morale
improved and that caused productivity to go up.
The influence that researchers can have on the
behavior of the people they study is now known
as the Hawthorne effect. It is proof that morale
and motivation are at least as important as the
physical environment and the tools available to
workers.
_I! Motivation Theories
Managers may attempt to motivate their workers
by using rewards, punishment, and charisma, or
by exercising authority. The method used will
depend on their beliefs about the causes of moti-
vation. By widening their knowledge of this sub-
ject, managers can use the appropriate motivating
technique and will make their workers and the
organization more productive and efficient.
What causes motivation and what diminishes it
have been the subjects of much research. Most
theories are based on observations of human
nature. Table 1 lists some theories widely accept-
ed within the management science community.
Keep in mind that human behavior is complex
and impossible to generalize. It varies from per-
son to person and depends on the particular situa-
tion. No single theory will be valid all the time.
Douglas McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y
propose that people either dislike work and
responsibility (Theory X) or enjoy self-direction
and achievement (Theory Y). Chris Argyris calls
Theory Y behavior "mature behavior." He pro-
poses that only immature people are passive and
lack initiative. Both authors believe that most
people conform to Theory Y assumptions in a
healthy work environment.
Argyris sees an unhealthy work environment as
characterized by overspecialization that limits
self-expression, by a rigid chain of command, or
by an overpowering leader. In such an environ-
ment workers have little control over their work
day. They are expected to be passive and sub-
servient and must have a short time perspective.
According to the theory, an unhealthy work envi-
ronment will cause the worker to cope by escap-
ing (e.g., leaving the firm or seeking promotion or
transfer), by fighting (e.g., joining a union or
seeking a way of exerting pressure on the organi-
zation), or by adapting and developing an attitude
of apathy, indifference, or cynicism. Flight, fight
or fatigue, Argyris judges the last option to be the
worst choice for the worker's mental health.
Theory X and Theory Y do not provide guide-
lines for all situations. They do not explain situa-
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Table 1. Motivation Theories
Theory Description
Thcory X
Theory Y
Self-fulfilling theory
Reinforcement theory
Needs theories
Equity theory
Expectancy theory
People dislike work and need to be coerced or bribed to do their jobs.
People enjoy work, will self-direct if allowed, and will strive to
succeed in the workplace.
People will attempt to fulfill their leader's expectations.
People become motivated or demotivated when faced with situations
similar to past experiences.
People become motivated when they attempt to fulfill their unmet
needs.
People become demotivated when, in their assessment, other
employees are being rewarded beyond their contributions to the
organization.
People become motivated when there is a high probability of
achieving desirable goals.
tions where good leadership can change the per-
formance of a worker or an organization. One
explanation for the change in behavior from
Theory X to Theory Y is the self-fulfilling theory
of human behavior (Cf. J. L. Single). This is the
idea that positive or negative expectations will
significantly influence worker behavior. Thus,
according to the theory, a unique characteristic of
superior leaders and managers is their ability to
create high performance expectations that the
workers fulfill.
Another theory based on innate human behavior
is the reinforcement theory. It proposes that peo-
ple's behavior can be explained in terms of posi-
tive or negative past outcomes. Thus, by reward-
ing desired behavior and punishing what is not
wanted, managers can supposedly control the
behavior of their workers. Psychologist B.F.
Skinner even suggests that by making use of pun-
ishment and rewards over a period of years, peo-
ple can be controlled and shaped while still feel-
ing free. Although this theory is strong justifica-
tion for managers practicing organizational
behavior modification, it has been criticized as
being manipulative and autocratic (Mondy, 296).
It also assumes that motivation comes from the
environment and is external to the person, over-
looking the simple fact that people are rational,
thinking entities who control their own actions.
Some theories attempt to explain motivation as
the drive to satisfy personal needs. They are
called needs theories of motivation. Table 2 com-
pares four of these theories. These theories pro-
pose that motivation occurs when a person
attempts to satisfy the lowest unsatisfied need.
For example, if workers perceive their jobs as
dangerous, they will attempt to satisfy the need
for safety and thus will be motivated to change
their environment to make it safer. They will con-
centrate their efforts in activities that satisfy their
unfulfilled need for a safer environment (the low-
est unsatisfied need) before attempting to fulfill
any higher need for creativity. Most U.S. workers,
according to Abraham Maslow, have satisfied the
two lower needs (physiological and safety) to the
point where their focus has shifted to the higher
needs (belongingness, self-esteem, and self-
actualization).
According to Frederick Herzberg's needs theory
of motivation, human needs can be grouped into
hygiene needs and motivators. Hygiene needs do
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Table 2. Comparison of Needs Theories of Motivation
Frederick Herzberg's Abraham Maslow's Clayton AIderfer's David McClelland's
Hygiene(demotivators)
• Pay
• Status
• Working conditions
• Fringe benefits
• Policies and regulations
• Interpersonal relations
Motivators
• Meaningful and
challenging work
• Recognition for
accomplishments
• Feeling of achievement
• Increased responsibility
• Opportunity for growth
andadvancement
Physiological
• Air, water, food, etc.
Safety and security
• Danger and job security
Belongingness and love
• Group acceptance
Self-esteem
• Achievement
recognition, and status
Self-actualization
• Use of creative talents
Existence
• Air, water, food, and
safety
Relatedness
• Interpersonal relations
Growth
• Promotions, salary,
and autonomy
Need for affiliation
• Friendship and social
activities
Need for achievement
• Challenge and goal
oriented
Need for power
• Influence and
domination
not motivate, but they can create dissatisfaction
and can thus be strong demotivators. Managers
must be constantly alert to ensure that these are
not hurting the organization. On the other hand,
motivators can encourage the superior perfor-
mance that will result in organizational syner-
gism. The leader or manager is also responsible
for using these motivators to benefit the
organization.
In McClelland's needs theory of motivation,
everyone has three needs: achievement, affiliation
and power. But for each person, one of these
needs is relatively stronger than the others,
Entrepreneurs and salespeople, for example, have
a high need for achievement, whereas the best
managers have more moderate achievement needs
(Cf. M. J. Stahl). A strong need for achievement
may actually impede effective delegation of tasksl
Also, needs may be cultural, as in Japanese work-
ers having a stronger need for affiliation than
U.S. workers.
The relevance of McClelland's theory is that,
depending on a person's needs, incentives may be
effective or ineffective. For example, a strong
need for achievement may require more autono-
my, but a preference for affiliation would dictate
team involvement. Hence, if a brilliant researcher
with high achievement needs is required to partic-
ipate in committee work, he or she may not see
such a request as beneficial or desirable even if
the committee's function is important to the orga-
nization. Similarly, a strong team player may feel
out of place in a position of team leadership with
responsibility for difficult personnel actions such
as firing and performance evaluation. In both
cases persons with different needs may eagerly
pursue those responsibilities.
Nevertheless, in addition to theories based on
human needs, other explanations for motivation
have been proposed. The equity theory, credited
to J. Stacy Adams, states that people base their
performance on the correctness of their perceived
situations. They do this by comparing their per-
formance and rewards with those of others.
Thus, a worker may decide to stop working
"hard" because someone else may get similar or
greater rewards with less effort. This inequity
may or may not be real, but it is the person's per-
ception that motivates or demotivates. Hence, it is
important for an organization to have fair and
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open reward and promotion systems. It is also
important to communicate to all employees the
specific reasons for promotions and rewards.
Another theory of motivation known as expectan-
cy theory was developed by Victor Vroom and
modified by Barry Staw. It has dominated
research in this field since the early 1970s. The
theory states that people are motivated by the
probability of achieving desirable goals. To
explain motivation, expectancy theorists use the
formula:
Motivation = E x V x I
where E denotes expectancy, the probability that
effort will lead to performance; V denotes
valence, the desirability of the predicted outcome;
and I denotes instrumentality, the perception that
rewards are tied to performance.
The expectancy theory gives managers useful
guidelines for improving the motivation of their
workers. First, training may be used to increase
expectancy. Second, any of the needs theories
listed in Table 2 will provide guidelines for
increasing valence. For example, people with
high security needs will value pension plans and
job security guarantees, whereas those with self-
actualization needs may require challenging
assignments or a creative environment. Finally, to
maintain instrumentality at a high level, the
reward system must be fair and open, with good
communication between management and
workers.
Today's high-technology professionals have been
characterized as highly educated, autonomy seek-
ing, and career motivated rather than company
dedicated (Cf. Glinow). Their allegiances are sus-
pect, and they are quick to change employers in
search of technical challenge or more autonomy
in their work (Bailyn and Raelin). They expect to
be rewarded for their work and expertise, and
they abide by ethics dictated by their professional
groups and not by their employers. In short, their
ties to their professional peers are stronger than
those to their employers.
These professionals are motivated by different
needs than those of their organizational counter-
parts, including managers and other support per-
sonnel (see Table 3). Numerous surveys have
found that technical professionals get the most
satisfaction from challenging work, autonomy,
and variety of work assignments but that man-
agers are challenged primarily by the opportunity
for promotion (Cf. Resnick). Managers, by train-
ing and personality traits, prefer predictability and
control in their areas of responsibility, but tech-
nologists thrive in a challenging and changing
technical environment.
Table 3. Motivators: Rewards Most Valued By
High Technology Professionals
Reward Motivator
Professional
Job content
Carper
Social status
or prestige
Financial
Opportunity to work with top-
flight professionals
Freedom to make own
decisions
Intellectually stimulating work
environment
Forward-looking organizational
goals
Ability to affect national goals
and policy
Productive atmosphere
Flexible work hours
Long-term project stability
Opportunity to address
important human needs
Patriotic projects
Prpjects of altruistic nature
Work for a leading-edge
company
Diverse opportunities for
personal growth and
advancement
Opportunity for self-expression
Opportunity to play a role in
the company's future
Opportunity to participate in
technological breakthroughs
Desirable location
Open-door management
Recreational facilities
Twice-yearly salary reviews
Compensation for unused leave
Cash bonuses
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_iii_ Motivators and Demotivators for
Scientists and Engineers
The rewards listed in Table 3 address motivators
as defined by Herzberg. Demotivators or hygiene
factors related to security and affiliation needs
have been identified by Resnick-West and Von
Glinow and are listed in Table 4. Demotivators
arise because the needs of the organization some-
times conflict with the needs of the professional.
If a proper balance between these two diverging
sets of needs is not found, both the organization
and the professionals will suffer.
Table 4. Demotivators: Culture Clashes
Between Professionals and Organizations
Category Organization Professional
Experts clash
Stan "dards clash
Ethics clash
Commitment
clash
Autonomy clash
Hierarchical
control ("The
boss is right")
Company
policies/rules
Company
secrecy
Company
loyalty
Organizational
decision-making
Exert control
("Let experts
&'cidc")
Professional
standard.s
Dissemination
of information
Loyalty to
profession
Desire for
autonomy
Donald C. Pelz conducted research to determine
what made researchers productive. He concluded
that some degree of creative tension between
sources of stability and security and sources of
disruption was needed to raise researchers' pro-
ductivity. Table 5 summarizes the eight creative
tensions that he identified. These tensions allow
researchers to question and gauge the usefulness
of their work in the real world. Data supporting
the influence of these tensions on researcher pro-
ductivity confirms this.
Pelz's research shows that scientists and engi-
neers increase their technical contributions when
each performs more than one task simultaneously
and has more than one area of specialization.
With muhiple specialties, the enhanced perfor-
mance is directly proportional to the number of
specialties. With multiple tasks the enhanced per-
formance continues until the researcher has four
simultaneous functions or projects. Additional
tasks may result in over commitment and ineffi-
ciencies that will be detrimental to performance.
Similar results plot the performance of scientists
and engineers as a function of the decision-mak-
ing sources including supervisor, project man-
agers, peers, and upper management. Effective-
ness correlates strongly to the number of deci-
sion-making sources the researcher has to
consider.
This appears to contradict the theory that
researchers will perform best when isolated from
distractions. Apparently, the cross-fertilization of
ideas and interpersonal relationships that are pos-
sible when a researcher is involved in a limited
number of projects with more than one source of
direction, before making a decision, has a positive
and desirable influence on his or her output. This
synergism should be the goal of any research
organization.
Additional research by Pelz illustrates the nature
of goal-setting synergism. Performance is higher
for scientists when the goals are set by the scien-
tist in conjunction with their supervisors than
when they are set by the supervisor alone or by
scientists alone. For engineers, effectiveness is
maintained even when working alone or only
with peers. This result may reflect the more prod-
uct-oriented work performed by engineers. Two
lessons appear evident from such research. First,
when the goal is clear, motivated workers will
achieve it with or without the help of manage-
ment. Second, when the goal is not clear, the best
results are achieved when both the manager and
the worker jointly define the task. More research
shows that although too little autonomy is not
conducive to high productivity, complete inde-
pendence is not the optimum either. Again, this
reinforces the theory that interaction is a neces-
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Table 5. Eight Creative Tensions
SECURITY [ CHALLENGE
Tension 1- Multiple Tasks
(None listed in the literature) Effective scientists and engineers in both research and
development laboratories did not limit their activities
either to pure science or to application but spent
some time on several kinds of R&D activities,
ranging from basic research to technical services.
Tension 2 - Interaction
Effective scientists were intellectually independent But they did not avoid other people; they and their
their or self-reliant; they pursued their own ideas and colleagues interacted vigorously.
valued freedom.
Tension 3 - Multiple Skills
(a) In the first decade of work, young scientists
and engineers did well if they spent a few years on
one main project.
(b) Among mature scientists, high performers had
greater self-confidence and an interest in probing
deeply.
But young non-Ph.D.s also achieved if they had
several skills, and young Ph.D.s did better when they
avoided narrow specialization.
At the same time, effective older scientists wanted
to pioneer in broad new areas.
Tension 4 - Autonomy
(a) In the loosest departments having minimum
coordination, the most autonomous individuals with
maximum, security and minimum challenge were
ineffective.
(b) In departments having moderate coordination it
seems likely that individual autonomy permitted a
search for the best solution...
More effective were those persons who experienced
stimulation from a variety of external or internal
.sources.
•.. to important problems faced by the organization.
Tension 5 - Influence and Goal Setting
Both Ph.D.s and engineers contributed most when ... but also when persons in several other positions
they strongly influenced key decision-makers.., had a voice in selecting their goals.
Tension 6 - Interaction
High performers named colleagues with whom they ... but they differed from colleagues in technical
shared similar sources of stimulation (personal style and stratcgy.
support) .. ,
Tension 7 - Teams
R&D teams were of greatest use to their ... but interest in broad pioneering had not yet
organizations at that "group age" when interest in disaplrmred.
narrow specialization had increased to a medium
level...
Tension 8 Interaction
In older groups that retained vitality the members ... yet their technical strategies differed and they
preferred each other as collaborators.., remained intellectually combative.
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sary ingredient in achieving high productivity in a
research environment.
These results seem to agree with Rensis Likert's
research in service organizations. He concluded
that high performers felt that they had a great deal
of influence in setting their own goals but that the
higher echelons had much influence also. He
noticed that there was more total influence on
high performers than on low performers. This
observation conflicts with some older theories of
organizational behavior that assume a fixed quan-
tity of influence to be shared between manage-
ment and workers. These older theories propose
that if workers have more influence, management
has less. Likert and Pelz propose that more total
influence is possible and desirable.
The clear message in these observations is that in
research organizations, higher performance
requires interaction between members of the
organization. Additional research repeats the mes-
sage and shows clearly that daily interactions are
better than less frequent interactions. This conclu-
sion also applies to projects, especially in the
early stages of concept definition. Finally, the
research shows that the best interactions are con-
sensus and influence as opposed to autocratic
management, where the manager alone deter-
mines the goals of the workers.
Interaction between organization members can be
encouraged by promoting participation in com-
mittees and project teams. The practice of concur-
rent engineering, for example, requires teams that
include representatives from research, marketing,
engineering, production, and others, according to
Carter and Baker. The fast and unconstrained
interaction by these specialists in a small work
group allows quick identification of key issues
and agreement on the best solutions. The resultis
reduced development time for new products (Cf.
Sprague et al.).
Further research shows that work groups tend to
become less effective with the passage of time.
Their performance decreases because interaction
decreases. As group members get to know each
other, interactions become predictable, reducing
the need for consultation and idea exchange. Old
groups may run out of new ideas. Management
should be on the lookout for teams and commit-
tees that need overhauling.
These results are consistent with the research by
Vollmer et al. Their work is summarized in Fig-
ures 1 and 2 for an aerospace industry research
laboratory and for a government defense research
laboratory, respectively. The vertical axis in the
chart, general job satisfaction, contains the
hygiene factors; the horizontal axis, professional
productivity, contains the motivation factors. The
charts are constructed so that issues can be evalu-
ated for their effect on satisfaction (hygiene) and
productivity (motivation). For example, in both
cases, productivity and satisfaction are associated
with freedom to influence the choice of research
assignment. Adequate salary is not a factor in
productivity but may be a factor in job satisfac-
tion. An inadequate salary will cause dissatisfac-
tion, but salary in excess of that which causes sat-
isfaction will not produce more satisfaction.
Clearly, salary is a hygiene factor.
/_iiiii Motivation of NASA Employees
To study the validity of the motivation theories
discussed previously, the results of two culture
surveys of NASA employees were analyzed. The
responses in the surveys were compared with the
theories to determine which theories best explain
the results. The first survey was performed in
December 1986 and the second in the spring of
1989. In the interim, Agency management imple-
mented new procedures to change the NASA cul-
ture in a positive way.
The results from the surveys are included in
Figures 3 to 11. Figure 3 describes the rating sys-
tem for the questions. A maximum of 5 was pos-
sible for each question. A rating of 1 means that
the statement is not perceived as true by the per-
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Illll II
PROFESSIONAL PRODUCTIVITY
IS ASSOCIATED WITH IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH
G
E
N
E
R
A
L
J
O
B
• Freedom of choice in research assignments
• Consultation with management on research
decisions
• Opportunity for promotion in own research field
• Opportunity to do interdisciplinary research
• Opportunity to do research with members of
own discipline
• Opportunity to do basic research
• Adequate s,,dary
• Adequate technical assistance
• Opportunity for promotion into management
positions
• Freedom in dayto-day research activities
None
• Opportunity to do applied research
• Opportunity to keep up-to-date on scientific
developments
• Adequate funds to support individual research
interests
• Adequate laboratory equipment
- Opportunity to persuade sponsor to support
research
• Recognition by name in connection with
re.search
• Opportunity to attend professional meetings
• Opportunity to publish research findings
Figure 1. Incentive in Relation to Professional Productivity and
General Job Satisfaction for Applied Researchers
IS ASSOCIATED WITH IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH
• Freedom of choice in research assignments •
• Opportunity to do basic research
S
A
T
I
S
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
None
Opportunity to do applied research
Recognition by name in connection with
research
Opportunity to attend professional meetings
Opportunity for promotion into management
positions
Freedom in day-to-day activities
Opportunity to do interdisciplinary research
Opportunity to do research with members of
own discipline
Consultation with management on research
decisions
Opportunity to keep up-to-date on scientific
developments
Adequatc technical assistancc and laboratory
equipmcnt
Adequate funds to support individual research
interests
Adequate salary
Opportunity to publish research findings
Opportunity for promotion in own research field
Figure 2. Incentive in Relation to Professional Productivity and
General Job Satisfaction for Staff Scientists
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son answering the question. A rating of 5 means
that the statement is perceived as completely true.
The aggregate responses in the figures represent
such a large number of responses that small varia-
tions are significant and meaningful. For exam-
ple, a response of 4.3 is more true than 4.2.
Each item in the Culture Questionnaire was
rated using the 5-point scale below:
I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5
Not Somewhat Very
Descriptive Dcscriptive Descriptive
Figure 3. Culture Surveys Rating System
Figures 4 to 6 present the ratings for questions
about work satisfaction, work unit climate, and
NASA culture. Figure 4 shows that NASA
employees are very proud to work for the
Agency. The rating is 4.4 out of a possible 5.0.
But the responses are not as high for the Center,
the work unit and the job. Although the ratings
are significantly higher than "somewhat descrip-
tive," there is a steady decline from NASA to the
Center, to the work unit, to the job.
This situation represents an opportunity and a
challenge to Agency management. The goal
should be to raise the level of employee satisfac-
tion with the job, the work unit, and the Center to
the level of satisfaction and pride resulting from
association with NASA. This is possible because
employees are favorably disposed to work for the
Agency. The solution is to make unit managers
aware of the situation and to give them the skills
to fulfill their workers' expectations. If the issue
of satisfaction is addressed at the work unit level,
a successful outcome will be felt in increased sat-
isfaction with the job, the Center and NASA.
Proud to work _,_._ 4.44
for NASA [ [ 4.43
Satisfied _5___h_ 3.82
w/job[ I 3.78
Satisfied l___,_-_, 3.77
w/NASA [ I 3.71
*Satisfied _\_.._ 3.75
w/Center
*Optimistic
about NASA's
future
Satisfied
w/work unit
_._:.x:)- 3.64
|_%_,_ _._._ __h,_ __x] 3.63
i ...............................................] 3.63
I I I I I
* New Item 1 2 3 4 5
Time 2 ["---7 Time 1
Figure 4. Survey Results: Work Satisfaction
Members of my work unit:
ri_ii_!!_!i_i_;.,:_._i..,.'.._i_,;.,:._N!_%.'_,_.--:_3.97Strive to do
their best
Work coopera- __:+:..,:,.. 3.91
tively w/other _1 3.99
units in Center
Trust one _i_._:i:_i!i_?...`..i!N_:!!_!_:!_!_!i_:_.::!!_!_N3.76
another [ I 3.74
Have sufficient _!i_!_::i:.::_::ii:::i_:_ii::!:::::i!:::_!i::i!iiiii_i:.!i_::_i_:::.i::::`_ii:_i_iiii_:;%_I 3.56
clarity re: [ 3.61
cxpcctauons
Are included [iiii_iii_iii_i_:_!iii_iii_iiiii_i_i_i_ii_i_!_!_i_!ii_i`..```_!_i_.`:i_;i_._]3.54in making I 3.15
decisions
Are properly " "...............[....................: ..,.. .................... 3.28
recognized for I ] 3.24
performance
I I I I I
1 2 3 4 5
Figure 5. Survey Results: Work Unit Climate
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COMPARATIVELY HIGH
Value high- 4.10
quality work I I 3.99
Org. effect based
on goals &
world leadership
_i_i_!_!_J!i_ 3.96
I 4.04
Loyalty to
NASA
_ i_..:=,...__ _i_...'..i_p ..._i!i_::!_!_!_! 3.92
] 3.89
Senior mgmL _ii_i] 3.54
emphasis on I I 3.92
public image
Career ::_!iiiiiiii_..."_.:,_,'.]3.35
development I I 3.27
Problem solving I_:':_..':_i_!;_i_;i_iit 3.22
I I 3.29
I 1 1 1 I
1 2 3 4 5
Time 2 [-"-'1 Time 1
* New Item
COMPARATIVELY LOW
Decision making __.,=_ ..... I 3.49
at higher level I 3.52
than necessary
Roles & missions
of Centers are
clear
_:.._.:.__%_.,.%_ _ 3.19
"Bad news" _ 3.01
passed up formal _1 2.87
channels
Senior mgmt. _:_-__;-_ 3.01
emphasis on [ _ 3.17
technical expertise
Senior mgmt. can |_:_:!_:::::_:_':::_3_1 2.94
be expected to do [ ] 2.83
the "right thing"
Efficient reward [::!::_!::_i!!_!_i'._i_:,._%._2 89
and recognition I I 2.65
Innovation _i_ii!_i!_-.._':i!___'.._,_ 2.87
perceived as too I I 2.65
risky
Power is shared |::_ii_'.-:-'._] 2.87
I I 2.74
1 I I l
l 2 3 4
Figure 6. Survey Results: NASA Culture
Both surveys indicate that employee satisfaction
is high and that employees are optimistic about
the future. A picture emerges of a work force that
is materially satisfied, all things considered, and
feels secure in its jobs. Figure 5 shows that team-
work is accepted, and that people trust and
respect their coworkers but that management is
not communicating goals and expectations with
clarity. Also, unit members would like to get
more recognition for their work. Note that on the
question "Members of my work unit are included
in making decisions that affect their work" the
rating was 3.15 in the first survey and 3.54 in the
second, a large improvement.
Apparently, the efforts to change the NASA cul-
ture after the Challenger accident were successful
and have resulted in more low-level participation
in the decision-making process.
Figure 6 deals with perceptions of the NASA cul-
ture. It is not surprising that most responses agree
that the Agency values high-quality work and
world leadership. Loyalty to NASA is also per-
ceived as being part of the NASA culture. A sig-
nificant drop is noted for "career development"
and an even lower rating was recorded for "suffi-
cient reward and recognition." Therefore, these
two areas are not perceived as being important in
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the NASA culture. Both areas address the self-
esteem and self-actualization needs of the
employees and offer an opportunity for NASA
management to motivate the work force.
The significant increase in participative manage-
ment could be improved further. Responses to
"power is shared" yielded a 2.87 rating, which is
less than "somewhat descriptive." This is corrob-
orated by the perception that decision-making
takes place at higher levels than necessary, a 3.49
rating, which is "somewhat descriptive."
Figures 7 to 11 compare what NASA employees
perceive to what they think should be. Under the
column "what is," the high quadrant lists respons-
es with ratings higher than 3.5 and the low quad-
rant lists items ranked lower than 3.5. The "what
should be" high quadrant gives the percentage of
responses that listed that item. For the NASA cul-
ture (Figure 9), the "what should be" includes
three self-esteem and self-actualization motiva-
tors and two standards-clash issues. The respons-
WHAT IS: WHAT SHOULD BE:
Value high quality work
Value excellence
H Expect IongNASA
I career
Base effectiveness on
G image as world leader
H Employees very loyal to
NASA
L
O
W
Sufficient individual
reward and recognition
Agency senior
management can be
expected to do the right
thing
People willing to share
power
Clear roles and missions
of NASA installations
Value high-quality work
- 66%
Maintain expertise
within NASA - 60%
Value excellence - 57%
Sufficient individual
reward/recognition- 50%
Clear roles/missions of
NASA installation
- 43%
::-::_: ._:_
;: "2
•
.; z"
Figure 7. NASA Culture Comparison
es value "high-quality work" and "value excel-
lence" demonstrate pride in the work done and
address fulfillment of self-actualization needs.
"Sufficient individual reward and recognition" is
a self-esteem issue. "Maintain expertise within
NASA" probably refers to the practice of sub-
contracting certain tasks. Subcontracting is an
Agency policy and can be classified as a stan-
dards clash. "Clear roles" is also a standards
clash. Both standards clashes are demotivators.
The "what is" responses "value high-quality
work" and "value excellence" in Figure 7 are in
agreement with "what should be." However, the
"what is" column also includes some hygiene
needs, such as "expect long NASA career" (safe-
ty and security) and loyalty to NASA (belonging-
ness). That these needs do not appear in the "what
should be" column indicates that hygiene needs
have ceased to concern NASA employees. A dis-
connect in Figure 7 is the importance of "suffi-
cient individual reward and recognition." It is
ranked low in the "what is" and high in the "what
should be." This self-esteem need apparently is
not being met and would be a strong motivator.
This same message is repeated in Figure 10.
Figure 8, which addresses decision-making,
shows a strong demotivator, an experts clash. The
"what is" column includes budget and scheduling,
typical management concerns. But the highest
ranked "what should be" is "decisions based on
research not politics," which is ranked low in the
"what is" column. This clash can be addressed by
delegating to technical personnel the authority
and accountability for meeting budget and sched-
ule constraints.
Figure 9, which addresses power sharing, repeats
the experts clash observed in the decision-making
process: "people (presumably management) qui-
etly hold onto their power," and "authority is
highly centralized." This clash too can be
addressed by delegating authority and account-
ability to lower levels of the organization.
Apparently, NASA management is not delegating
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H
I
G
H
L
0
W
WHAT IS:
Budget pressures greatly
affect decisions
Schedule pressures
greatly affect decisions
Decisions delegated to
lowest possible level
Decisions based on
research, not politics
Management
communicates decisions
and rationale to
employees
Decisions based on open
discussion and debate
WHAT SHOULD BE:
Decisions based on
research, data, technical
criteria; not politics
- 39%
Decisions based on open
discussion/debate- 19%
Implementors involved
in decisions - 14%
Mgmt. communicates
decisions and rationale to
employees - 9%
Figure 8. Decision-making Comparison
enough to satisfy the high expectations of the
work force even though progress was made dur-
ing the time between surveys.
Figure 10 covers the subject of rewards, a self-
esteem need. The "what is," stating that rewards
are political, stands in sharp contrast with "what
should be," which is recognition for individual
and work unit performance. Clearly, NASA man-
agement can enhance the morale and motivation
of the work force and encourage better perfor-
mance by upgrading the reward system.
Another disconnect that appears in Figure 10 is
the statement that "people orientation is important
for advancement." This is ranked high in the
"what should be" and low in the "what is." This
may explain the previous finding that people are
less satisfied with the unit and the Center than
with NASA. It appears that the supervisor-
employee interaction is one of demotivation. The
implication is that unit managers must be sensi-
tized to the human needs of their employees.
A significant unmet need is career satisfaction. In
Figure 11 the "what should be" responses present
the message that clearly defined career paths are
expected. These expectations are not always satis-
fied. The following two disconnects are present:
"managers take time to discuss career planning"
and "there are viable career paths for non-super-
visory employees" are both ranked high in the
"what should be" and low in the "what is." The
third disconnect, "higher level manager taking
personal interest," can also be explained as a
reflection of the same desire for formal and clear
career paths.
WHAT IS: WHAT SHOULD BE:
H People with technical
knowledge can get
I things done
G People quietly hold onto
their power and authority
H Authority is highly
centralizcg
Employees are treated
fairly and equitably
L
0
W
People are willing to
share their power
People are willing to
share their power - 39%
People with technical
knowledge can get
things done - 23%
Employees are treated
fairly and equitably
-21%
Figure 9. Power-sharing Comparison
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WHAT IS: WHAT SHOULD BE:
H
I
G
H
L
0
W
WHAT IS: WHAT SHOULD BE:
Real reward is work
itself
Getting rewarded is
political
People orientation is
important for
advancement
For individual
performance there is
recognition/reward
For work unit
performance there is
recognition/reward
PA system provides
useful discussion of
work performance
For individual
performance there is
recognition and reward
- 40%
People orientation is
important for
advancement- 17%
For work unit
performance there is
recognition and reward
- 14%
Real reward is work
itself- 12%
_.
Figure 10. Rewards Comparison
_ Conclusions
Table 6 lists some lessons that have been learned
from this research. First, it can be concluded that
the needs theories of motivation, especially
Herzberg's and Maslow's, agree with the results
of the NASA culture surveys. The responses to
the surveys appear to indicate that NASA
employees are satisfied in their hygiene needs and
are striving to satisfy self-esteem and self-actual-
ization needs. The most significant observation is
that the need for belonging is satisfied. NASA
employees are proud to be part of the Agency and
have a high opinion of their coworkers. With their
belonging needs satisfied, NASA employees
enjoy a greater degree of employment satisfaction
than the general population (Cf. Mondy, 298).
The consequence is that to motivate their employ-
Higher level manager
taking personal interest
H is important for
I advancement
Managers are encouraged
G to attend formal
development activities
H
Career management is
shared responsibility of
both employee and
manager
L
0
W
Managers take time to
discuss career planning
with their people
There are viable career
paths for non-
supervisory/managerial
employees
There are people at the
Center who provide
careerguidanceand
counsel
Career management is
shared responsibility of
employee and manager -
39%
Managers take time to
discuss career planning
with their people - 19%
There are viable career
paths for non-
supervisory managerial
employees- 14%
Figure 11. Career Satisfaction
ees, NASA managers must address self-esteem
and self-actualization needs. Two possibilities are
recognizing accomplishment and establishing bet-
ter and clearer career growth paths. The first
addresses self-esteem and the second, self-actual-
ization. More consistent use of these motivators
would result in a more productive organization.
In the two culture surveys NASA employees sent
a clear message that not enough is being done in
the areas of recognition and career planning. This
deficiency should be remedied because recogni-
tion and career growth are the most important
sources of satisfaction and motivation for older
and more experienced workers. Career growth
need not mean a move into management. The
dual-ladder option, where opportunities for pro-
motion to higher grades are available to non-
supervisors, is a good alternative. What is impor-
tant is that employees know that they are moving
toward a desirable career goal.
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Table 6. Motivation of Employees: Lessons for NASA Managers
THEORY AND SURVEY RESULTS LESSON
1.
,
.
.
.
.
Needs theories describe the behavior of NASA
employees: NASA employees have satisfied their
hygiene needs (safety, security, and affiliation).
NASA employees strive to satisfy self-image and
self-actualization needs. Managers should not
confuse hygiene and motivation needs
Needs theories give an indication of valence V
(i.e., desirability of the outcome) in the
expectancy theory.
Motivation = E x V x I
Employee training is important because of
expectancy E (i.e., the effort leads to
performance).
Motivation = E x V x I
Communication is important because of
instrumentality I (i.e., rewards are tied to
performance).
Motivation --- E x V x I
NASA employees are dissatisfied with the lower
levels of the organization. Employees want
people-oriented managers.
NASA has made progress in implementing
participative management, but practices are still
below employee expectations.
Continue present practices in areas of safety,job
security, and team building.
Address self-image with awards; address self-
actualization with career planning. Note that pay
and performance appraisals are hygiene factors
and will not motivate. Use professional growth
as a motivator.
Identify and address the needs of employees.
Continue and expand training programs.
Use newsletters and awards ceremonies to
celebrate significant accomplishments.
Make unit managers more sensitive to the needs
of employees. Develop training programs.
Expand man ager "s awareness and training.
7. Work groups are desirable because they promoted Use concurrent engineering, quality circles, and
interaction. But groups in existence for long teamwork. Reorganize teams and committees
period of time lose effectiveness, periodically and add new members.
8. More outside influence is better than complete Negotiate goals and objectives between manager
autonomy, and employee. Review periodically.
An important consequence of accepting the needs
theories of motivation is a reduced dependence on
salary as a motivator. Of course money is impor-
tant, and workers that are not compensated fairly
for their efforts can be unhappy and demotivated.
As stated by the equity theory of motivation, the
perception of fairness in compensation can be an
important factor in demotivation. But after
acceptable compensation is reached, other factors
can be more effective in promoting superior per-
formance and excellence. Thus, reliance on "pay
for performance" as a motivator overlooks more
effective approaches. Similarly, performance
reviews are not motivators. Some good reasons
for having performance reviews include the
opportunity for the manager to communicate to
the employee the goals of the organization and
for the employees to state their own. But it is
unreasonable to expect the performance appraisal
process to be a source of motivation.
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The expectancy theory of motivation is an impor-
tant extension to the needs theory. By proposing
expectancy E, valence V, and instrumentality I as
the causes of motivation, the theory gives practic-
ing managers a good indication of what needs to
be done to motivate subordinates. In addition to
addressing the basic human needs, managers must
support training and be fair and open when
awarding promotions and rewards.
The responses to the surveys show that NASA
employees are unhappy with the lower levels of
the organization. Specifically, they want unit
managers to be more people oriented. Unit man-
agers must do a better job of career counseling
and they must do more to make participative
management a reality. These issues can and
should be addressed through training programs
for supervisors.
_ Lessons for NASA Project
Managers
Finally, work groups are good and should be
encouraged as much as possible. The same is true
for all kinds of interactions, such as project and
task reviews and staff meetings. They should be
used by management to promote interaction
between employees.
Projects are high-intensity, goal-oriented endeav-
ors. In the course of day-to-day activities the pro-
ject manager and staff must continuously rank all
the demands on the limited resources available to
the project. In such an environment it is easy to
rank employee needs and motivation below other
more immediate concerns, such as schedules and
cost targets. This is not done on purpose, and the
assumption usually is that the sacrifices are tem-
porary and needed to achieve a short-term goal.
Unfortunately, designating employee needs and
morale as issues of secondary importance is detri-
mental to the project's host organization. An
example of this was reported in The Soul of a
New Machine (Kidder, 1981). The book records
the design and development of a new computer.
Although all the technical goals were achieved in
record time, the feat was accomplished at great
cost to the organization because one year after the
new computer was introduced, all the members of
the design team had left the company.
Although this may be an extreme example, any-
one with project experience can give examples of
poorly motivated people working well below
their capabilities. If management truly believes
that employees are the organization's most valu-
able resource, this situation is not acceptable.
The use of surveys allows project managers to
track the status of their team, the human portion
of their system. The important results of these
surveys are the trends, and, therefore, surveys
must be repeated periodically. The survey is anal-
ogous to the feedback signal in a control system.
By continuously monitoring the attitudes and
motivation of a team, a project manager can take
a proactive approach to problem solving. An
example of an attitude survey is included in
Figure 12; it is kept short to compensate for the
frequency of survey, repetition.
Employee Satisfaction
1. I'm proud to be a part of the NASA team.
2. I'm proud of my Center.
3. I'm proud to work in the project.
Motivation
4. At work I'm performing at my full capability.
5. I have the proper training to do my job.
6. At NASA rewards are tied to performance.
7. In my Center rewards are tied to performance.
8. In the projects rewards are tied to performance.
9. In my branch rewards are tied to performance.
10. The following motivate me: job security,
challenging work, money, a safe workplace,
teamwork.
Goals
! 1. The goals of projects are well defined and clear.
12. The goals of my branch are well defined and clear.
13. My goals are well defined and clear.
14. I participate in setting my goals.
15. I participate in setting the project goals.
Figure 12. Sample Survey
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Where are the Real Engineers?
by G. Harry Stine
Recently, I have been involved as a consultant on
an engineering project. I'd prefer not to mention
names because this column is likely to get a little
rough on some of the people I worked with. In
any event, the purpose of this column isn't to
point fingers but to reveal a disturbing trend.
Maybe something can be done about it.
The goal of the project was to build something
and test it. The device did not exist, although a lot
of studies and many technical papers have been
written about it in the last 40 years. The first goal
was to design, build and operate a proof-of-prin-
ciple prototype. This would be a cheap and dirty
off-performance piece of ironmongery using off-
the-shelf technology and hardware. It would be
used to check out some of the questionable
approaches to the solution, find out if the
approach was really workable, discover the items
that are always overlooked even in the best
designs, and then allow the company to proceed
with the pre-production device with a higher
degree of confidence and a lowered level of risk.
Furthermore, it had to be done on a total budget
that was embarrassingly small and on a time
schedule that was impossibly short.
Briefly, this approach is standard, old-hat, every-
day engineering that you use when you are trying
to do something new and different. No big deal,
right? Wrong!
In this particular industry, no one had been
allowed to make a mistake in the last 30 years.
Everything had to work perfectly the first time.
Everything had to be a success when the switch
was flipped or the button pushed.
It has been a fascinating experience to watch the
way both experienced old-time engineers (who
are now managers) and fresh-caught engineers
tackled the project.
The old-time engineers had to battle two decades
of on-the-job experience. Tattooed on their brains
was the dictum: "Thou shalt not fail, it must work
the first time, and thou hast no room for error."
Well, that attitude can be handled because these
older engineers remember the time when it wasn't
that way. It's not too difficult for them to shift
mental gears and get back to the old method that
amounts to: "Well, hell, let's just whomp up a
boilerplate test model of this puppy and see if it
passes the smoke test when we plug it in!" That's
what engineering used to be all about, and it's one
of the factors that made it fun.
Engineering used to operate on the principle,
"Experience gained is directly proportional to the
amount of equipment ruined."
Then you could forge ahead to design and build
stuff that would not bust. Prototypes were not
worth a damn unless you busted them. Otherwise,
you would underestimate yourself and did not
need the prototypes at all.
Once that ancient principle was reestablished in
the minds of the engineering management, the
project became fun. But it did not make it any
less stressful. The lack of big money and the short
deadlines kept the pressure on. I could see the
gradual metamorphosis of the older engineers (of
which "I are one," too).
The real problems came with the young engineers
who had recently (within the last ten years)
received their engineering degrees. The young
engineers were brilliant when it came to design
work. They knew how to run computer analyses
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until the floor was covered with printouts. They
were whizzes with CAD.
But they had never "bent tin." They had never
been responsible for designing something that
could be built and was supposed to do something.
This puzzled me at first. Then I figured out what
had happened.
Fifteen years ago, my son decided he wanted to
be an engineer so he could become a product
designer. So we went to several colleges and uni-
versities to see what their engineering curricula,
facilities, and teaching staff amounted to.
Turns out that something had changed in Engine
School.
Two career paths existed (and still exist) for
engineers.
An engineering degree now consists of an
extremely strong emphasis on scientific theory,
mathematics, and computer technology. And
practically no hands-on laboratory work! The
venerated engineering degree has been converted
into a degree in applied science!
On the other hand was the path leading to a bach-
elor's degree in "engineering technology." Upon
close investigation, I discovered that this poor
stepchild of modern undergraduate study was
indeed the sort of hands-on, practical engineering
curriculum that I was familiar with back at mid-
century. But it no longer turned out "engineers."
It graduated lowly "engineering technologists."
Aha! No wonder that some of the modem prod-
ucts of engineering seemed to be less than elegant
in their design, construction, and operation! They
have, essentially been designed by scientists, not
engineers! The real grubby-handed engineers,
now called "engineering technologists," have
come along after the "engineers" are finished.
The engineering technologists are the ones who
have had to make the damned product work after
the design has been approved!
(I have nothing against scientists. In fact, my
degree is in physics, not engineering. Scientists
are needed to explain why something works after
inventors conceive it and engineers make it work.
Yes, some modern products have sprung from the
science lab. But far more of them have come
from inventors.)
Robert A. Heinlein, an engineer himself as well
as an eminently practical scientist, put it very well
in The Rolling Stones in 1962: "Fiddle with
finicky figures for months on end-and what have
you got? A repair dock. Or a stamping mill. And
who cares?" Hazel Stone missed one of the exis-
tential joys of engineering: Pride in making it
work the way it is supposed to.
Dr. Wernher von Braun was one of the best real
engineers I have ever known. I saw him do engi-
neering right out on the test stands with the tech-
nicians. When I read his biography, I understood
why.
Von Braun studied at Charlottenburg Institute of
Technology, Germany's equivalent of MIT and
Cal Tech. As part of his education, he was
apprenticed to the Borsig Werk. There, an old
foreman handed him a chunk of iron about as
large as a child's head. He also gave von Braun a
file and pointed to a bench vise. He was told,
"Here are your tools. Make this into a perfect
cube. Make every angle a right angle, every face
perfectly flat and smooth, and every side equal."
Five weeks later, von Braun had filed the chunk
of iron into the required perfect cube that had
become the size of a walnut. But size had not
been specified! Borsig then put him 'o work on a
lathe, on a shaper, in the foundry, in the forge,
and finally in the locomotive assembly sheds.
Von Braun later recalled that he had gotten more
5O
insight into practical engineering during that
apprenticeship period than he had in any semester
in the university.
Today, von Braun would have received a degree
in engineering technology, not engineering.
And the engineers involved today in the project I
used as a nameless example are learning the hard
way what engineers used to learn in undergradu-
ate work and their first few years in the field.
They are having to bend tin against a schedule.
They are having to make do with what they can
get off the shelf. They do not have one thin dime
for R&D. They are learning to read Thomas'
Register. They are learning how to scrounge
through junk yards to find something cheap that
will do the job. They are facing a world where
good enough is the enemy of the best, where an
adequate solution today is far more important
than a perfect solution tomorrow.
I am convinced both the old hands and the young
pups will do just fine on the project. I expect
them to destroy the prototypes but also to learn
from that. And they are going to come out of the
project as one of the best damned engineering
teams in the industry. The company they work for
has a long and proud history of building gadgets
that work, making money for the company and
the customer, and staying in service for decades. I
will not have to tell you who they are; you will
know.
Now, what are we going to do about this dichoto-
my of engineers and engineering technologists.'?
If I wanted again the challenge of putting together
an engineering team to do things, I think I would
be partial to hiring engineering technologists. One
of our problems in the United States is our pen-
chant to study things to death before risking our
careers on the real possibility of a failure, regard-
less of whether it is an engineering job or a busi-
ness deal. Yes, we have got to use our resources
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wisely and do our best to succeed rather than fail.
Be we have been studying things too much. Time
to build and bust some prototypes.
We have got to stop studying things to death. We
have got to be willing to bust prototypes. We have
to get out there in the world, make things that
work, and produce them. t
I had a friendly controversy going on with Arthur
C. Clarke, whom I had known for more than 40
years. I kept telling him, "Arthur, we are not all
going to sit around in front of our computer ter-
minals being creative and communicating with
one another in the global village. Someone is still
going to have to milk the cows!" (Or attach,
remove, clean, and repair the milking machines.)
Another friend of mine, L. Sprague de Camp,
begins his excellent book, The Ancient Engineers,
thusly: "Civilization, as we know it today, owes
its existence to the engineers. These are the men
who, down the long centuries, have learned to
exploit the properties of matter and the sources of
power for the benefit of mankind."
We do not need to educate more scientists in
America. We need more engineers. I think it is
time we ended the experiment of calling educated
applied scientists "engineers" and transitioned
back to what we know works: Educating more
grubby-handed "engineers with hairy ears and
long and woolly britches," as the old and
unprintable ditty goes.
Maybe we also need to adopt the European cus-
tom of permitting a real engineer to place before
his/her name the honorific, "Ing." Then turn them
loose to continue changing the world as they have
for centuries.
Originally published in the December 1992 issue
of Analog Science Fiction & Fact magazine and
reprinted here with permission of the author.
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Resources for NASA Managers
by William M. Lawbaugh
What's New in the Program/Project
Management Library Collection
Following is a list of books that have most recent-
ly been added to the PPM Library Collection. All
of the materials may be borrowed through interli-
brary loan from your Center Library. Call Jeffrey
Michaels at (202) 358-0172 for further infor-
mation.
Leadership Jazz
by Max Depree
Call number: HD57.7.D47 1992
Beyond Race and Gender
by R. Roosevelt Thomas
Call number: HF5549.5 .M5 T46 1991
Zapp! The Lightning of Empowerment
by William C. Byham
Call number: HD58.8 .H362 1989
The Age of Unreason
by Charles Handy
Call number: HD58.8 .H362 1989
The Goal
by Eliyahu Goldratt
Call number: PR9510.9 .G64 G6 1986
A Great Place to Work
by Robert Levering
Call number: HP5549.2 .U5 L385 1988
Enlightened Leadership
by Ed Oakley
Call number: HD57.7.023 i991
A Whack on the Side of the Head
by Roger yon Oech
Call number: BF408 .V58 1983
A Kick in the Seat of the Pants
by Roger yon Oech
Call number: BF408 .V579 1986
Total Quality Training
by Brian Thomas
Call number: HF5549.5 .T'/T46 1992
The Wisdom of Teams
by Jon Katzenbach
Call number: HD66 .K384 1993
TQM Field Manual
by James Saylor
Call number: HD62.15 .$29 1991
Still More Games Trainers Play
by Edward E. Scannell
Call number: HM133 .$314 1991
100 Training Games
by Gary Kroehnert
Call number: T65.3 .K76 1991
Guide to Quality Control
by Kaoru Ishikawa
Call number: TS156 .G82 1982
Completeness: Quality for the 21st Century
by Philip B. Crosby
Call number: HD62.15 .C76 1992
Benchmarking: A Practitioner's Guide for
Becoming and Staying Best of the Best
by Gerald J. Balm
Call number: HD58.9 .B345 1992
Continuous Improvement and Measurement
for Total Quality
by Dennis C. Kinlaw
Call number: HD62.15 .K56 1992
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Mining Group Gold
by Thomas Kayser
Call number: HD66 .K39 1990
Managing the Total Quality Transformation
by Thomas Berry
Call number: HF5415.157 .B47 1991
Are You Communicating?
by Donald Walton
Call number: P90 .W24 1989
Beyond the Hype: Rediscovering the Essence
of Management
by Robert Eccles
Call number: HD31 .E27 1992
_ Book Reviews
Peak Performers:
The New Heroes of American Business
by-Charles Garfield (New York: William Morrow
& Co., 1986)
"To me, Apollo 11 represented a temporary end to
a peculiar form of discrimination," says the
author of Peak Performers, "the discrimination
against being the best you can be."
Charles A. Garfield worked for Grumman
Aerospace on Long Island in 1967 when "going
to work there every morning was like signing up
for one of the great adventures on Earth." As a
novice computer programmer, he helped design
and build the Lunar Excursion Module for Apollo
11. There and then Garfield decided to study
"missions that motivate" and find out more about
the high-level achievement he saw and experi-
enced in the Apollo program.
After Apollo, Garfield left his career in mathe-
matics and pursued a Ph.D. in clinical psycholo-
gy. Along the way he interned in the cancer ward
of a California medical center, thinking these
patients were the exact opposite of the peak per-
formers he met at Grumman and NASA. Wrong.
The courage to stay alive he saw there convinced
him that the "focus of control" for peak perform-
ers was not external but internal.
In 1979 he had a chance meeting in Milan, Italy,
with Soviet-bloc physiologists, doctors and
research psychologists who changed the whole
nature of his study. There experts from East
Germany, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union told
Garfield about the "psychophysics" used by their
Olympic athletes to access their hidden reserves
and "actualize their human potential." They
explained how peak performance can be
learned-deliberately, systematically and pre-
dictably. "My heart started to pound," says
Garfield.
After some relaxation techniques, Garfield
engaged in visualization exercises, imagining
himself lifting 365 pounds of barbells confidently.
He then actually did it, with their encouragement
and to his amazement. He experienced the same
exhilaration he felt during Apollo.
Over the years as a clinical psychologist, Garfield
isolated six factors that constitute peak perfor-
mance in athletics, business, government and the
arts.
. Missions that motivate. As JFK did for
Apollo, someone gives the call to action that
pulls people together for a common achieve-
ment. Some call it "inspiration."
. Results in real time. Intangible rewards along
the route to the goal of a mission, such as
meaning, satisfaction or a sense of improve-
merit.
. Self-management. Self control and self mas-
tery towards a clearly defined goal. Some call
it "discipline."
. Team building. Empowering others after self-
mastery. Some simply call it "teamwork," a
buzzword of the 1990s.
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5. Course correction. Finding and navigating a
critical path. Change is not only inevitable but
anticipated by peak performers.
6. Change management. This involves lifelong
learning, expectations of success, mental
rehearsals and constant renewal.
These six factors are perhaps not the only attrib-
utes of peak performance, but they are the ones
researched and confirmed by Garfield as he stud-
ied people at their best. He gives examples and
anecdotes to describe each factor in each succes-
sive chapter.
In the end he says peak performers know who
they are instinctively, and that the condition is
dynamic, not static. He quotes psychologist Carl
Rogers: "The good life is not any fixed state...
nor contentment, nor nirvana, nor happiness,"
thus debunking a host of American dreams.
Rather, "The good life is a process, not a state of
being. It is a direction, not a destination." So,
too, is the attitude of a peak performer.
Peak Performers was published in 1986. Since
then much has happened in the world, especially
in the former Soviet Union. We can chuckle when
Garfield praises People's Express airline or
quotes Jane's Spaceflight, for example: "The U.S.
is developing a new breed of military astronauts,
because generals fear that superpower skirmish-
ing in space is 'almost inevitable' in the next 25
years."
Nevertheless, Garfield's book is still quite rele-
vant and enjoys a renewed level of interest. It is
light and clear enough as a beach read, but most
readers get the idea that the author is in search of
something magical and elusive. He's on to some-
thing, but whether he has captured it or put it in a
bottle is doubtful. That he has tried, however,
does seem very important.
I
The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People:
Restoring Character Ethic
by Stephen R. Covey
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989)
Jim Fletcher says this book "suggests a discipline
for our personal dealing with people which would
be undoubtedly valuable if people stopped to
think about it." Charles Garfield calls it "a won-
derful contribution." He adds: "Dr. Covey has
synthesized the habits of our highest achievers
and presented them in a powerful way." Lavish
praise for what has became the most widely read
success book of the 1990s.
It all began when the Brigham Young University
management professor took a sabbatical to Oahu,
Hawaii. At the college library, "my eyes fell upon
a single paragraph that powerfully influenced the
rest of my life." The unquoted paragraph
"basicalIy contained the single idea that there is a
gap or a space between stimulus and response,
and that the key to both our growth and happiness
is how we use that space." In other words, it
doesn't matter what happens to us, good or
bad-what really matters is how we react to the
events in our lives. They either build us up or
break us down.
The BYU professor notes that the first 150 years
of "success literature," beginning with Ben
Franklin's autobiography, centered on what he
calls "Character Ethic." The past 50 years or so
centered on "Personality Ethic" which Covey
finds superficial, clearly manipulative, intimidat-
ing and even deceptive.
These later success books tried to change outward
behavior and style, but Covey says the only real
change is internal, "inside-out." He calls for a
"principle-centered paradigm shift" (echoing the
buzzword of the 1980s) from "get rich quick"
schemes and "wealth without work" to self-evi-
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dent principles derived from "natural laws" such
as fairness, service, quality and integrity.
Yet, when Covey lists and describes the seven
synthesized habits or regularized principles, they
differ little if any from the Dale Carnegie-Earl
Nightingale-Peter Drucher-Tom Peters-Charles
Garfield success literature the author describes.
Certainly the seven habits will not hurt anyone
trying to succeed. The reader is not convinced,
however, that these are the top seven, much less
that only seven habits are needed to provide "a
holistic, integrated, principle-centered approach
for solving personal and professional problems."
Nevertheless, they are interesting and useful, and
they include:
1. Be Proactive. "Between stimulus and
response, man [and woman] has the freedom to
choose," says Covey. Proactive people do not
blame others or make excuses, but rather
choose deliberately and turn failures into learn-
ing opportunities. Eleanor Roosevelt once said:
"No one can hurt you without your consent."
2. Begin with the End in Mind. This is the
book's longest chapter, perhaps because it is
the most derivative. Covey here asks every
potential leader to write a personal family and
work group mission statement and then affirm
and visualize it. "One of the main things his
research showed," says Covey, referring to
Charles Garfield, "was that almost all of the
astronauts and other peak performers are visu-
alizers. They see it; they feel it; they experi-
ence it before they actually do it. They begin
with the end in mind."
3. Put First Things First. In the previous chapter
Covey quoted Drucher and Bennis:
"Management is doing things right; leadership
is doing the right things." In this chapter, he
advises: "Organize and execute around priori-
ties, and discipline to say no or delegate
adroitly."
4, Think Win/Win. This involves a shift in think-
ing from a paradigm of competition (I win, you
lose) to one of cooperation where "agreements
or solutions are mutually beneficial, mutually
satisfying." Covey is speaking of cooperation
in the workplace, leaving All-American
Competition for the marketplace.
. Seek First to Understand, Then to Be
Understood. Although Covey does not
attribute this habit, it derives from the "Prayer
of Peace" of Francis of Assisi. Covey calls it
"empathic listening," from the term empathy.
Since oral communication is only 10 percent
by words, 30 percent by sounds and 60 percent
by body language, this empathic listening calls
for listening with your ears, your eyes and your
heart or soul. Then you really connect.
. Synergize. Another '80s buzzword, like "para-
digm" or "empower". As described, synergism
is the third alternative of two opposing
views-not the dichotomous either/or stance,
but both/and, or as Covey would have it,
win/win. His business associates, through syn-
ergistic free association and brainstorming,
came up with their mission statement: "Our
mission is to empower people and organiza-
tions to significantly increase their perfor-
mance capability," which throughout the book
is abbreviated as EC.
. Sharpen the Saw. Principles of balanced self-
renewal. Here Covey tries to synthesize the six
habits into a seventh but actually produces the
best chapter of the book. His marvelous Four
Dimensions of Renewal can stand alone: physi-
cal (invigorating exercise), spiritual (medita-
tion as a source of power), mental (read a clas-
sic a week, keep a journal) and social/emotion-
al (in service to others for true happiness).
This chapter should be read first, especially by
those who are interested in TQM. Over all, The
Seven Habits of Highly Effective People is nicely
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written but hardly original. The documentation is
poor, and some lists and charts are bewildering.
(There's even an 800 number where you can call
for even more charts, plus a catalog from the
Covey Leadership Center and a list of upcoming
Covey seminars, retreats and newsletters.) Some
readers swear by this book; others look at it as
just another success book. A lot of people are still
buying it, hoping to become better leaders and
managers.
Readings in Systems Engineering
Ed. by Francis T. Hoban and
William M. Lawbaugh
NASA SP-6102 Washington, 1993
The core of this collection of 17 widely divergent
approaches to systems engineering consists of
specially commissioned papers from the NASA
Alumni League. Owen Morris, Chuck Mathews,
John Hodge, John Naugle, Kranz and Kraft,
Yardley and Wensley, and Bob Aller are all repre-
sented here, along with people who made their
mark on systems engineering in government and
industry.
The collection begins with the classic formulation
of systems engineering given in 1969 by Robert
A. Frosh. His common sense approach sets the
tone for the next dozen or so analyses and slants
on a difficult subject. Not just successful tools
and techniques are described and discussed, but
failures as well, in particular Skylab 1 and the
1978 Seasat mission. The book ends with a jovial
reaction to this discipline as it was being intro-
duced in one of the NASA Centers 25 years ago.
Readings in Systems Engineering is 218 pages,
but readable and clearly presented. Designed pri-
marily for the next generation of systems engi-
neers, the book shows the richness of diversity in
an increasingly important emerging management
discipline.
NASA Systems Engineering Handbook
By Robert Shisko and
Robert G. Chamberlain, et al.
PPMI Publication-Draft September 1992
"This handbook was written to bring the funda-
mental concepts and techniques of systems engi-
neering to NASA personnel in a way that recog-
nizes the nature of NASA systems and the NASA
environment," the authors say. That's no easy
task, but the 120-page handbook is amply illus-
trated and well written.
As the authors indicate, the content as well as the
style of the NASA Systems Engineering
Handbook shows a teaching orientation. That's
because the book covers many of the topics
taught in NASA's Project Management and
Program Control courses.
The handbook consists of four main sections and
three helpful appendices. Part one includes defini-
tions and descriptions of systems engineering,
while the second section takes the NASA Project
Cycle from Phase A through Phase F, plus fund-
ing and product development. The material on the
project cycle is drawn from the work of the Inter-
Center Systems Engineering Working Group,
which met periodically in 1991.
The third and lengthiest section covers
"Management Issues in Systems Engineering,"
including the Systems Engineer Management
Plan (SEMP) the WBS, scheduling, resource
planning, risk management, baseline manage-
ment, reviews and reports. Section four is called
"Systems Analysis and Modeling Issues." It
includes the Trade Study Process, cost modeling,
effectiveness measures and handling uncertainty.
The appendices consist of the inevitable acronym
list, a unit called "Use of the Metric System" with
a handy conversion table and, best of all, a set of
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eight systems engineering templates and exam-
pies, including three techniques of functional
analysis.
Currently the handbook is being tested out in
NASA's Program/Project Management Initiative
and is under review from experts in the field. The
NASA Systems Engineering Handbook is not a
substitute for a Center handbook, but the two are,
or should be, complementary. No footnotes are
used to clutter the narrative; sidebars are used
instead. Two foldout charts in the second section
are referred to in the discussion of the NASA
Project Cycle.
The NASA Mission Design Process
An Engineering Guide to the Conceptual Design,
Mission Analysis, and Definition Phases
NASA Engineering Management Council
December 1992
Shortly after the NASA Engineering Management
Council (EMC) was formed in 1991, the need
emerged for a clear, compact definition of the
mission design process. This slight, 64-page doc-
ument is described as a "reference compendium
of proven approaches to be used by those knowl-
edgeable and experienced in NASA projects and
aerospace technology."
It is a handy document, consisting of six sections,
including a detailed glossary in the introduction, a
compact list of acronyms at the end, and several
detailed charts and tables to display the flow of
design activities.
"Implementing and Managing the Study Process"
shows how a study team is formed and offers
guidelines of the necessary, thorough study effort.
The authors suggest "6-10 percent of the develop-
ment costs" be allocated to mission design. They
say cost problems during Phase C/D will be mini-
mized, but if less is spent, "larger margins and
contingencies must be maintained" until proper
definition of requirements and systems.
The biggest section is devoted to "Mission
Design Activities" and covers the basic activities
and tools from requirements to technical perfor-
mance measurement for familiar and new tech-
nologies. In discussing cost, schedule, perfor-
mance and risk, the authors make distinctions
between robustness (the ability of a system to
absorb changes) and flexibility (design features
that permit workarounds in problems on orbit).
They emphasize the obvious, but often forgotten:
"Any schedule extensions will always result in a
cost increase."
The subsequent sections cover Pre-Phase A (con-
ceptual design) studies, Phase A (mission analy-
sis) and Phase C/D (execution) but not launch nor
mission operations, often described as Phase E
and E A brief closing section on "Conducting a
Compressed Study" suggests that communica-
tions lines be shortened, decision-making stream-
lined, design meetings held daily and the list of
activities be prioritized. They also advise "maxi-
mum utilization of existing designs and hard-
ware" for a compressed study.
The NASA Mission Design Process is available
from the EMC or from Dr. Michael G.
Ryschkewitsch, Code 704, Goddard Space Flight
Center.
,_..,_:_Video Reviews
International Ultraviolet Explorer
Lessons Learned and Experiences Shared
in NASA Project Management
1992:30 min.
On January 26, 1978, a three-stage Delta rocket
carried what the narrator, Carter Dove, calls "the
world's most productive astronomical satellite"
into a low elliptical orbit. IUE was one of the first
general-purpose research facilities launched by
NASA.
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Dr. Albert Boggess, Project Scientist, attributes
much of the success to good communications
among scientists, engineers and managers on the
project. Project Manager Gerry Longanecker
explained how managers would alternate meet-
ings between the U.S. and Europe while Britain
built the four onboard cameras and ESA supplied
the solar arrays. Weekly conference calls were
placed at a prescribed time to England.
Charles Freschsel, IUE Operations Manager,
points to the "complete and unambiguous require-
ments" and "thorough testing" as key ingredients,
while Kenneth Sizemore, Spacecraft Manager,
describes IUE's unique onboard computer for
attitude control. He says that fixed-price contracts
were used for off-the-shelf items while cost-plus
was better for the gyros, which needed substantial
development.
The big management challenges were Delta
weight restrictions and delays from the British
telescope manufacturers. A dedicated engineer
resolved IUE's hydrazine temperature problems
early in the project. Tradeoffs and workarounds
saved the day for IUE.
This half-hour video was produced under the aus-
pices of PPMI Program Manager Edward
Hoffman and is available from the NASA
Headquarters Library.
The International Sun Earth
Explorer-3 Mission
Lessons Learned and Experiences Shared
in NASA Project Management
March 1991: 30min.
In 1978, ISEE-3 was launched on a Delta rocket
from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on a
930,000-mile mission to study the effect of solar
wind on Earth's magnetosphere. Its flexible
design and contingencies gave ISEE-3 a much
longer life than the expected three years.
Project Manager Jerry Madden is an advocate for
MBWA, management by walking around or wan-
dering about. "You've got to know the base of the
pyramid," you can miss an engineer or two, but
these technicians "make it work."
Deputy Project Manager Dr. Stephen Paddock
explains the teamwork that brought ISEE-3 in on
schedule and under budget. John Hraster wore
two hats as Systems Manager and Mission
Operations Manager, while Experiment Manager
Martin Davis describes the flexibility needed to
coordinate 12 instruments from Goddard Space
Flight Center, other NASA Centers, the European
Space Agency, industry and academia. Spacecraft
Manager Don Miller, the rookie on the team, tells
how the cost-plus award fee contract took more
time but was suitable for the integration and test-
ing of subsystems manufactured inhouse.
Jerry Madden has lots of advice for younger pro-
ject managers. First of all, delegate authority and
give others plenty of resources but "never tell
them how to do it." Also, no surprises or shocks
for Headquarters: inform them, warn them in
advance of any potential problems, and invite
them to open, major meetings. An unexpected
request for much more money for your projects
means "you hurt some other project.., someone
else has to pay for your mistakes."
Like the IUE video, the ISEE-3 ends with a list of
about a dozen "lessons." The narrator, Carter
Dove, indicates that a subsequent PPMI video
will feature the follow-on project, ICE, the
International Cometary Explorer, which evolved
from this one. The PPMI Librarian at NASA
Headquarters Library can provide this and other
PPMI video productions through Center
librarians.
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